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Growing concern about poverty in the late 1960s produced two sweeping legal revolutions. One gave welfare recipients rights against arbitrary
eligibility rules and benefit terminations. The other gave low-income
tenants recourse when landlords failed to repair their homes. The 1996
welfare law exposed the welfare rights revolution’s frailty. Little-noticed
by legal scholars, the tenants’ rights revolution also has failed, and for
broadly similar reasons.
Withholding rent deliberately to challenge landlords’ failure to repair
is unduly risky for most tenants in ill-maintained dwellings: either moving
to better housing is a better option or the risk of retaliation is too great.
The implied warranty could still motivate landlords to repair if it limited
evictions of low-income tenants who fall behind on their rent for other
reasons, but a set of little-noticed doctrines deemed these tenants
unworthy to claim the warranty’s protection. Moreover, reformers left
implementation to courts with neither the resources nor the inclination to
transform landlord-tenant relations.
None of this was inevitable. The doctrines effectively limiting the warranty to deliberate rent withholding have weak justifications. And contemporaneous procedural innovation in other areas of law offered alternatives
to the unresponsive courts.
More daunting was the transformation of the housing market. Fewer
low-income tenants live in decrepit dwellings, but many suffer housing
problems whose consequences may be even more severe: overcrowding,
locations remote from jobs and good schools, and rents that crowd other
necessities from their budgets. Lacking a clear, unified purpose, the
tenants’ rights revolution cannot begin to adapt to these changes.
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INTRODUCTION
The anti-poverty movement in the 1960s spawned two seemingly very different legal revolutions. In public law, the courts gave low-income people new substantive and procedural rights to welfare and other public benefits while Congress established new or expanded programs providing health insurance, food assistance, and aid to the elderly and persons with disabilities. In private law,
courts and state legislatures recognized sweeping new rights for low-income tenants. The focus of this effort was implying a warranty of habitability in residential leases, which warranty was made mutual with the tenant’s covenant to pay
rent. The foundational cases of these two revolutions, Goldberg v. Kelly1 and
Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,2 are the only two poverty law cases most
law students read.3
Over the past two decades, many of the pillars of the welfare rights revolution
have collapsed. Congress repealed the sixty-year-old Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) welfare program,4 sought to strip welfare recipients of
legal entitlements,5 slashed program funding,6 and shifted policymaking authority
to states,7 whose will8 and capacity9 to assist low-income people is open to question. More broadly, the switch from large surpluses early in the last decade to
deficits as far as the eye can see,10 and the impending retirement of the baby
boomers, have created fiscal pressures likely to lead to strong pressures for
further cutbacks in these programs.11 The prospects for substantial improvements
1

397 U.S. 254 (1970).
428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
3
Some contracts casebooks include Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 556 (D.C.
Cir. 1965). That case initially seemed to be the opening shot in a revolution on behalf of low-income consumers. Difficulty formulating satisfactory doctrinal bases of such a program, however,
left only a smattering of isolated cases. The difficulties that aborted the nascent low-income
consumers’ revolution parallel closely those of the tenants’ rights revolution addressed below.
4
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, §
103(a)(1), 110 Stat. 2105, 2112, repealing 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1994).
5
Id. § 116(c), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 601 note (2006) (disclaiming any entitlement to cash
assistance after October 1, 1996); id. § 601(b) (same); see David A. Super, Are Rights Efficient?
Challenging the Managerial Critique of Individual Rights, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1085-97 (2005)
(describing the accomplishments and limits of legal entitlements in public benefits law)[hereinafter
Super, Efficient Rights].
6
DAVID A. SUPER, ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, THE NEW WELFARE LAW (1996)
(finding that the 1996 welfare law cut almost $55 billion over six years from programs for lowincome people).
7
See Jon Michaels, Deforming Welfare, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 573, 598-99 (2004) (identifying
structural and substantive difficulties in transferring welfare programs to states).
8
See Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accounting for the
Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552 (1999)(finding state political processes
dominated by affluent suburban interests hostile to low-income people).
9
See David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2614-40 (2005)(finding states’ fiscal constitutions implicitly biased against programs for low-income people and particularly ill-suited to maintaining countercyclical programs).
10
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK (January 2010).
11
See HENRY J. AARON & ROBERT D. REISCHAUER, COUNTDOWN TO REFORM: THE GREAT SOCIAL
SECURITY DEBATE 51-53 (2001)
2

to the government’s tax-and-transfer policies for low-income people therefore are
cloudy at best.
Under these circumstances, regulatory policy naturally will receive renewed
attention as an alternative means of relieving low-income people’s difficulties.
Developing countries that lack the resources and infrastructure to relieve poverty
through tax and transfer policy commonly maintain a range of industrial subsidies, price controls, trade restraints, and other market interventions with the goal
of easing the burdens of their poorest citizens.12 Anti-regulatory economists have
largely persuaded policymakers in this country that direct governmental transfers
are a far-superior means of poverty reduction,13 but both legislatures and courts
are likely to reopen that question if direct transfers cease to be available alternatives. If they do, the tenants’ rights revolution, the boldest regulatory assault on
poverty since the New Deal, will be a major focus of attention.
Re-examining the tenants’ rights revolution is particularly timely because of
the housing glut resulting from the collapse of the housing bubble and high energy costs that are driving many more affluent people to abandon suburbs and return to central cities. Although not widely recognized at the time, a similar housing glut14 helped launch the tenants’ rights revolution. That glut forced a historically anomalous moderation in rents that caused many to believe tighter regulation was possible. The glut of the 1960s and 1970s resulted from the white middle-class’s abandonment of the central cities in response to racial fears, the Federal Housing Administration’s (FHA’s) deep subsidies of building costs, and the
new Interstate Highway System’s subsidy of commuting costs from those suburbs. Many of the new suburbanites were first-time home-buyers, vacating urban
rentals. For those that owned homes in the cities, the subsidies were sufficient
for many to be willing to absorb large losses on their former homes. This created
a huge glut of housing, much of it initially quite good, that the urban rental market had to assimilate. For a variety of reasons, however, much of that housing
was lost, and with it the prospects for a relatively inexpensive improvement in
millions of low-income tenants’ quality of life. Losing the housing being vacated
today due to mortgage foreclosures and reurbanization would repeat that tragedy.
The welfare rights revolution gave recipients of subsistence benefit programs
the right to advance hearings to challenge reductions or terminations in those

12

Economists commonly blame policies restricting free trade for poverty in developing countries.
See, e.g., JEFFREY D. SACHS, ENDING POVERTY 52-55 (2005); MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM 72-73 (1962). Whether or not this oversimplifies, the reverse certainly is often true:
severe poverty, and the failure to address it directly through transfers, creates political imperatives
to intervene in the market for low-income people.
13
FRIEDMAN, at 177-82.
14
Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Landlord-Tenant Law, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 562-67
(1984).
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benefits15 and prohibited eligibility conditions not authorized by federal law,16 in
particular rules counting money not available to families as income.17
The essence of the tenants’ rights revolution was similarly straightforward.
Legislatures and courts implied warranties of habitability and repair into residential leases18 and made them mutual with the tenant’s covenant to pay rent.19 Tenants could raise the landlord’s failure to comply with these obligations as a defense in an eviction proceeding for nonpayment of rent.20 This was seen as updating landlord-tenant law from the archaic vision of estates in land to the modern world of contracts, as giving landlords incentives to repair blighted housing,
and as giving low-income tenants better lives. An early flurry of scholarship debated the economics of housing code enforcement and, by extension, its privatelaw analogue, the implied warranty of habitability. In the following years, however, almost every state’s legislature or courts adopted the new regime. Courts
and legal scholars hailed these changes as breakthroughs in the battle against
slum landlords, as powerful new remedies with which the urban poor could compel their landlords to adequately maintain their buildings.21 Yet the results
achieved by these changes in the law have been far from what their advocates
predicted.
The welfare rights revolution foundered for six basic reasons. First, it lacked
a coherent, broadly accepted set of goals. Some saw the changes as modernizing
administrative law to reflect contemporary means of security analogous to traditional property rights.22 Some saw the changes as means of achieving various instrumental ends23 such as expanding the workforce,24 promoting children’s education,25 or preserving social peace.26 Some saw them as strengthening programs
more broadly as a means of redistributing wealth,27 reversing a deeply entrenched
28
American resistance to redistribution. Finally, some saw the new legal regime
15

Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 272-74.
Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
17
Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552 (1970).
18
See, e.g., Javins; Lemle v. Breeden, 462 P.2d 470 (Haw. 1969); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
554.139 (West 2008); UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 4.105, 7B U.L.A. 620
(2000) [hereinafter URLTA].
19
Berzito v. Gambino, 308 A.2d 17 (N.J. 1973); Fritz v. Warthen, 213 N.W.2d 339 (Minn. 1973).
20
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5720(1)(f) (West 2008).
21
See, e.g., Carl Schier, Draftsman: Formulation of Policy, 2 PROSPECTUS 227 (1968); Mary Ann
Beattie, Persuader: Mobilization of Support, 2 PROSPECTUS 239 (1968).
22
Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964).
23
David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism and the Failure of
Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 597 (2008)[hereinafter Super, Laboratories].
24
DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT 19-25 (1988).
25
HERBERT J. GANS, THE WAR AGAINST THE POOR 115 (1995).
26
WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE 319-21 (5th ed. 1994).
27
Super, Laboratories, at 596.
28
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (arguing that the structure of government must ensure
the defeat of factions seeking redistribution).
16
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in narrower, humanitarian terms as a means of relieving the most severe hardships.29 Although subscribers to these widely divergent viewpoints could all support new procedural rights for welfare claimants, their coalition quickly fractured
when new challenges arose. In the end, the revolution performed badly in most
of these dimensions.
Second, at the same time the new order was empowering low-income people,
it could not resist moralizing about them. During the New Deal, the Court boldly
declared that ―[p]overty and immorality are not synonymous.‖30 By the 1960s,
however, the Court was conceding low-income people’s immorality and making
only technical arguments against rules to punish them: ―Congress has determined that immorality and illegitimacy should be dealt with through rehabilitative measures rather than measures that punish dependent children‖.31 It temporarily abandoned its interpretive methodology to permit local governments to deny
aid to families refusing intrusive investigations of their morality.32 And beginning just weeks after Goldberg v. Kelly, it upheld rules reducing or denying benefits based on dubious individual33 or collective34 moral judgments. For low-income people, the material sustenance these rules withheld was far more important than the procedural rights it granted. If anything, the veneer of procedural
regularity added to the sting of these moralizing rules, inhibiting deeper change
by giving the impression that only the confirmed immoral still faced hardship.35
Third, the new regime lacked a coherent, plausible theory of the nature and
causes of poverty. It seemed to regard poverty as the result of an aberration, the
isolated irrationality of a hasty eligibility decision or a rogue eligibility rule. In
particular, it assumed that low-income people, although financially impoverished, were relatively affluent in human capital. Thus, people dependent on subsistence benefits providing far less than even many part-time minimum wage
jobs nonetheless were assumed to have the procedural sophistication to initiate
and prosecute claims under legal rules that even the Supreme Court once characterized as ―an aggravated assault on the English language, resistant to attempts to
understand it.‖36 When it turned out that few recipients could, and that Congress
was unwilling to fund legal services lawyers to handle more than a tiny fraction
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Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 277; Super, Laboratories, at 594-95.
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 167 (1941).
31
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 327 (1968).
32
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
33
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (declining to determine whether state had adequately
accounted for the needs of children in large family).
34
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972)(allowing states to provide lower grants to families
with children, a group composed primarily of African-Americans and Latinos, than to the
predominately white elderly and persons with disabilities).
35
David A. Super, The New Moralizers: Transforming the Conservative Legal Agenda, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 2032, 2066-72 (2004)[hereinafter Super, New Moralizers].
36
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 (1985).
30
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of the cases,37 the new procedural rights became an occasional annoyance38 rather
than a meaningful force in program operations.39
Fourth, and related, the welfare rights revolution had crude vision of economics and, in particular, of the conditions and incentives of low-income people.
It ignored that transaction costs’ impact on people with very limited means could
approximate that of denials of benefits.40 More broadly, it ignored the all-encompassing sense of vulnerability that dominates low-income people’s lives, creating
fear that assertiveness must be paid for most dearly. This simplistic economic
model also ignored complexities of the incentives and opportunities facing those
whom it sought to influence: welfare eligibility workers.
Fifth, the welfare rights revolution had an equally crude vision of institutional
behavior. It incorrectly assumed both that administrative hearing procedures and
broad class action lawsuits would motivate individual eligibility workers to follow rules41 and that no contrary pressures would arise.42
Finally, the welfare rights revolution assumed that the conditions afflicting
low-income people were static and would succumb to static reforms. It thus was
unprepared for the economic changes after the recessions of 1979-82 eliminated
many of the high-paying, low-skilled industrial jobs that had been the ladder out
of poverty for tens of millions. Thus, the poverty rate generally declined through
the 1970s as Congress strengthened anti-poverty programs43 but then rose dramatically as President Reagan pushed deep cuts in those programs through Congress44 and recipients could find only low-paying, often contingent service-sector
jobs.45 It also failed to anticipate changing models of program administration,
particularly privatization.46 The lack of consensus about the reforms’ goals, as
well as the difficulty of the economic challenges, prevented formulation even of
a coherent proposal to adapt to dramatic changes in housing markets, labor markets, and anti-poverty policy in subsequent decades.
This article argues that the tenants’ rights revolution suffered from the same
six fundamental defects that prevented the welfare rights revolution from having
a meaningful impact on poverty – and that it has failed similarly. Part I surveys
the genesis of the implied warranty of habitability and related innovations. It
finds the same normative ambivalence, cleaving on very similar lines, that pre37

Super, Efficient Rights, supra note 5, at 1093-95.
Id. at 1087-88.
39
Id. at 1097-1117.
40
David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The Rise of the Personal Choice Model for Rationing Public Benefits, 113 YALE L.J. 815, 832-35 (2004) [hereinafter Super, Invisible Hand].
41
Super, Efficient Rights, at 1086-89.
42
Id. at 1097-1117.
43
Super, Laboratories, supra note 23, at 584-86.
44
Id. at 587-88.
45
MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP 348-53 (2001).
46
David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CAL. L. REV. 393, 433-44
(2008).
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vented the welfare rights revolution from adapting. Some saw the reforms in
solely legalistic terms: replacing property law’s exceptionalism with the efficient
universality of contract. Others had instrumental aims, seeing tenants as a means
of improving the urban physical environment. Still others saw the reforms as a
covert means of achieving broader redistributive ends. Finally, some held a humanitarian vision of empowering tenants to remedy deplorable housing conditions.
Part I then distills the conditions that must be met for those reforms to achieve
each of these purposes. It finds that tenants’ ability and willingness to assert the
implied warranty of habitability are crucial. Two groups of tenants face significantly different incentive structures, with financially stable tenants much less
likely to withhold rent voluntarily to force a confrontation with their landlords
than deeply impoverished tenants are to challenge their landlords’ failure to
repair when they become involuntary defendants in eviction actions after falling
behind for other reasons. Also vital are the courts’ allocation of sufficient adjudicatory resources to these cases and ability to transform their relationships with
landlords and tenants. Finally, much of the benefit of the new regime depends on
favorable housing market conditions. Although several theories of such conditions emerged, the most important raise significant paradoxes.
Part II identifies the key obstructions to the reforms’ effectiveness. One set of
barriers are little-noticed substantive restrictions on the implied warranty of habitability that have the effect of preventing most involuntary defendants – those
most likely to raise the warranty – from doing so effectively. The other barriers
are procedural, arising from the lower courts’ failure to adapt to the very different
goals and demands of the new regime they were asked to enforce.
Part III criticizes the implementation of the new regime, both in its own terms
and from the perspective of broader changes in the low-income housing market.
It finds dubious policy and doctrinal support for the substantive rules that have
closed the courts to tenants in decrepit housing whose confrontations with their
landlords resulted from poverty rather than militancy. It also suggests lessons
from the ―new property‖ realm of public benefits can guide adjudication in the
―old property‖ world of landlord-tenant law. In the end, however, it finds fundamental changes in the low-cost housing market transformed the meaning of bad
housing conditions, leaving the new legal regime ill-suited to confront low-income tenants’ most serious problems. This suggests far stronger commonalities
between fiscal and regulatory anti-poverty law than is commonly understood.
The article concludes with some observations about how to combat all types
of housing problems and some broader suggestions about how regulatory interventions can be more effective on behalf of low-income people.
I. THE PROMISE OF THE TENANTS’ RIGHTS REVOLUTION
The tenants’ rights revolution of the late 1960s and the 1970s was unusual in
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that it proceeded simultaneously through case law and legislation.47 In some
states, the courts went first in announcing a warranty of habitability. In others,
the legislature acted, sometimes by adopting the Uniform Residential Landlord
and Tenant Act (URLTA)48 and sometimes by amending existing summary
eviction statutes. Although the implied warranty received considerable attention
in states that had been wracked by urban unrest in the 1960s, it came into force in
many rural states at about the same time.
With such broad and diverse adoption, it should not be surprising that the implied warranty of habitability had more than one driving purpose. Section A
identifies four leading purposes of the tenants’ rights revolution. All but one of
these purposes was instrumental. Disagreement about the relative importance, or
even basic legitimacy, of these purposes proved important in limiting their effectiveness, as Part II infra demonstrates. Section B then explores the conditions
necessary for the achievement of the new regime’s instrumental goals.
A. The Goals of the Tenants’ Rights Revolution
Four major purposes animated the tenants’ rights revolution. Subsection 1
analyzes the legalistic, modernizing narrative of these reforms as replacing a
paradigm based on estates in land with one based on contract law. Subsection 2
explores the instrumental motivation: improving the quality of urban housing
through the agency of tenants of substandard units.49 Subsection 3 briefly
sketches the redistributive motives of some reformers. Finally, subsection 4 considers the humanitarian vision of these reforms as improving the lives of low-income tenants. Although these goals are superficially harmonious with one another, and indeed often invoked jointly by advocates of the reforms, Part III will
demonstrate that the full realization of one of these visions may be inconsistent
with the others.
1. Modernization: Triumph of Contract
Some courts and legislatures sought to explain the implied warranty of habitability, and the process of treating it as mutual with the tenant’s duty to pay rent,
as harmonizing landlord-tenant law with broader principles of contract law.50
47

See Neil K. Komesar, The Revolution in Landlord-Tenant Law: A Comparative Institutional
View, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 612 (1984)(urging comparison of the efficiency of these two paths).
48
9 U.L.A. 107 (Supp. 1999); see Charles J. Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and the
American law Institute, 27 STAN. L. REV. 879 (1975)(discussing how ALI helped lead this
transformation).
49
Other factors also may have contributed to the reforms. Some small states with part-time legislatures often adopt uniform laws such as URLTA as an efficient way of keeping in step with the rest
of the country. Similarly, once several states’ courts had adopted the implied warranty, other states
may have followed suit absent any clear reason to make the law of their state an outlier. None of
these considerations, however, likely would have driven such a thorough overhaul of centuries of
well-settled law.
50
Javins, 428 F.2d at 1075; see generally Leslie E. Gerwin, A Study of the Evolution and Potential
of Landlord Tenant Law and Judicial Dispute Settlement Mechanism in the District of Columbia,
Part I: The Substantive Law and the Nature of the Private Relationship, 26 CATH. U. L. REV. 457
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Some courts undoubtedly felt that the principles embodied in contract law were
inherently fairer than the medieval property concepts that previously governed
leases in particular and landlord-tenant relations in general. And some may simply have been offended by the disparity in treatment between landlords and tenants: while the courts rigorously enforced tenants’ obligations to pay rent with
expedited procedures, landlords were under virtually no pressure to perform their
obligations to their tenants.51
This vision had the virtue of simplicity. The lease, as amended by the implied
warranty, became a contract between landlord and tenant. As with parties to
other contracts, their relationship was to be symmetrical before the law. The
courts had long provided landlords with services essential to their businesses:
eviction procedures, operating far more expeditiously than other civil actions, allowing landlords quickly and inexpensively to could coerce and remove any tenants not paying rent. The courts would now demand that, in exchange for this
extraordinary help in requiring tenants to perform their legal obligations, the
landlords themselves must comply with the law on health and safety. Contract
law already had a host of principles for assessing performance, handling mutual
breaches, measuring damages, and so forth. This allowed the new legal regime
to burst onto the scene already fully formed, without need for the time-consuming articulation over series of cases that had been required to transform civil
rights law and criminal procedure.
The central principles of the new regime of landlord-tenant law were as familiar to contract law as they were alien to feudal property law.52 The landlord’s
new implied covenant of repair was made mutual with the tenant’s covenant to
pay rent.53 The tenant owed the landlord rent only as long as the landlord maintained the premises. The landlord’s failure to maintain the premises violated a
condition to her or his right to receive rent.54

(1977).
51
Javins, 428 F.2d at 1082.
52
But see Michael Madison, The Real Properties of Contract Law, 82 B.U.L. REV. 405, 410-26
(2002) (questioning whether the new regime of landlord-tenant law is true to contract principles);Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 773, 820-34 (2001) (positing a more complex allocation of functions between property and
contract).
53
Rome v. Walker, 196 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Mich. App. 1972).
54
The purely contractual rights tenants received with the implied covenants of repair are occasionally confused with rights tenants received at approximately the same time to participate in code
enforcement proceedings. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.530(3)-(5) (West 1997); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 441.570 (West 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-92(b) (West 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5321.07B(1) (Anderson 2004); Drew v. Pullen, 412 A.2d 1331, 1334 (N.J. App. Div. 1980);
DePaul v. Kauffman, 272 A.2d 500 (Pa 1971). Under these schemes, the tenant essentially
becomes an agent of the code enforcement system. The tenant imposes what amounts to a penalty
by depriving the landlord of rent until the landlord brings the premises up to code. Lakewood v.
Novak, 746 N.E.2d 719 (Ohio Mun. 2000).
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Because the contractarian view of the tenants’ rights revolution saw those
changes as an end in themselves, it did not depend on any further actions by landlord or tenant. It did, however, depend on the courts to hew fairly closely to established principles of contract law in deciding landlord-tenant disputes. Their
failure to do so would mean that one idiosyncratic legal regime, based on notions
of estates in land, would give way to another, based on current public policy preferences. The creation of a large core of common principles of contract law had
been one of the law’s great achievements in the nineteenth century.55 Given the
instrumental nature of the other three major goals of the tenants’ rights revolution, keeping landlord-tenant law in harmony with the larger body of contract law
could be difficult. Although both landlords and tenants might invoke contract
principles when convenient, the modernizing vision as an end in itself had no obvious, reliable advocates before either legislature or court. Indeed, some advocates’ embrace of contract principles was so purely tactical that they failed to
notice when contract law reasoning offered a rebuttal to efforts to restrict the
scope of the reforms.
2. Urban Restoration: Improving Rental Housing Conditions
Some courts’ and legislatures’ goals were more instrumental: they saw the implied warranty and its enforceability in actions for nonpayment of rent as means
of compelling landlords to maintain their buildings up to some minimum standards of repair. Deteriorating housing conditions have serious negative effects
on surrounding communities: they depress property values and hence property
tax revenues, they may contribute to the spread of insect and rodent infestation,
they give the city a negative image with visitors, and they are correlated with
crime. States therefore have reasons to want to ameliorate bad housing conditions that are completely independent of any concern for the well-being of lowincome tenants. In this regard, these reforms sought to remedy the failures of
―inefficient and unworkable‖ code enforcement56 that had failed ―to halt or reverse urban blight.‖57
3. Redistribution
Although not surprisingly underrepresented in judicial opinions, another significant force driving the tenants’ rights revolution was a desire to redistribute
power,58 wealth,59 and income60 into the hands of low-income people. They saw

55

LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 464-68 (1973).
Brett R. Dick & John S. Pfarr, Jr., Detroit Housing Code Enforcement and Community Renewal:
A Study in Futility, 3 PROSPECTUS 61, 90 (1969).
57
Judah Gribets & Frank Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and Remedies, 66 COLUM. L.
REV. 1254 (1966); see Samuel Jan Brakel, URLTA in Operation: The Oregon Experience, 1980
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 565, 578.
58
SAR A. LEVITAN, THE GREAT SOCIETY’S POOR LAW 177-79 (1979)(describing the goals of the
Office of Economic Opportunity’s Legal Services Program).
59
Jonathan I. Rose & Martin A. Scott, “Street Talk” Summonses in Detroit’s Landlord-Tenant
Court: A Small Step Forward for Urban Tenants, 52 J. URB. L. 967, 979 (1975)(offering Marxist
56
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the landlord’s property rights, and tenants’ lack of such rights, as defining
broader status relationships.61 Redistributivists believed that landlords’ rents
were super-adequate and sought public intervention to transfer this value back to
tenants.62 They sought to increase the bargaining power of tenants, especially
poor tenants, relative to their landlords.63 Where tenants’ only legal remedy
against their landlords had been costly and ineffective affirmative suits for
damages, which, absent implied covenants of habitability, might have to be based
on relatively far-fetched tort theories, they could not expect to have much effect
upon the landlords’ behavior. The threat of cutting off all rent revenues to a nonrepairing landlord, however, when backed by law limiting the recoverability of
that rent, would have to be taken much more seriously and would be much more
likely to motivate landlords to make concessions to their tenants in the form of
needed repairs. Many redistributivists saw the implied warranty of habitability
and related doctrines not as ends in themselves but as necessary complements to
achieving rent control64 and other policies that more directly redistributed wealth.
Even on the left, however, this view was controversial: some felt that targeting landlords for redistribution diverted low-income people’s attention from the
system as a whole.65 They also saw legalization and institutionalization as sapping the tenants’ rights movement’s vital strength and paving the way for a backlash.66
4. Humanitarianism: A Better Life for Low-Income Tenants
One need not favor general redistribution of income to seek to ameliorate the
most severe forms of hardship. Although this country’s politics have staunchly
rejected broad governmental redistribution of income, they have been much more
sympathetic to efforts to prevent hunger, homelessness, and other forms of extreme hardship. This is true even where the required market interventions causes
some dead-weight loss to the economy. Humanitarians have, however, faced the
administrative challenge of how to limit their interventions to those most in need
and the political challenge of convincing policymakers and the public that they
are not redistributionists.
Similarly, the desire to improve housing conditions is not necessarily the
same as improving the lot of the tenants in that housing. Urban renewal in the
1960s addressed decrepit housing conditions by evicting tenants and demolishing
critique of housing markets); Myron Moskovitz, Moving Toward Tenant Control of Housing, in
TENANTS AND THE URBAN HOUSING CRISIS 203 (Stephen Burghardt, ed. 1972).
60
Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes,
Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093, 1096, 1195 (1971).
61
Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants’ Voices
in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533, 571-75 (1992).
62
Rose & Scott, at 977.
63
Beattie, supra note 21, at 227-28.
64
Scofield v. Berman & Sons, 469 N.E.2d 805, 812 (Mass. 1984); Rose & Scott, at 971 n.18.
65
FRANCES FOX PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE’S MOVEMENTS 20-21 (1977).
66
Id. at xxii.
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it. The HOPE VI program in the 1990s took a similar approach to dilapidated
public housing projects: the bad housing may be gone, but the tenants whom it
had affected most were no longer around to enjoy whatever had replaced it.
Thus, the instrumentalist desire to press landlords to repair their dwellings is not
necessarily pro-tenant even though it depends heavily upon tenants raising and
winning claims. Evicting low-income tenants and converting their former homes
into well-maintained housing for the affluent would meet the narrow objective of
eliminating decrepit housing conditions.
An important objective of the reforms was to improve the lives of the most
hard-pressed tenants.67 Although framed in terms of expanding tenants’ rights,
these rights existed to serve some purpose. Just as the civil rights movement won
rights that people of color could apply to improve their well-being, so too this
vision of the tenants’ rights movement believed that giving low-income tenants
greater rights against their landlords would offer the means for those tenants to
improve their standard of living.
Although some jurisdictions were moving to recognize the implied covenant
of habitability in residential leases in the early 1960s,68 the urban riots of the mid1960s put housing law ―into a completely new perspective.‖69 Studies done
immediately after the riots indicated that bad housing conditions were a major
cause of the disturbances.70
B. Requirements for the New Regime’s Success
Under the new landlord-tenant regime, tenants can bring repair disputes to
court either offensively or defensively. Once the courts or legislature imply a
warranty of habitability into residential leases, tenants in bad housing may sue
their landlords for damages;71 some jurisdictions also will grant equitable relief to
such tenants. In practice, however, most tenants remaining in bad housing lack
the legal or economic resources to sue affirmatively. As a result, the best chance
for repairs to be adjudicated is in connection with an affirmative defense or
counter-claim to the landlord’s action for possession for nonpayment of rent.72 If
the tenant can prove the existence of defects in the premises, the court should
determine that she or he does not owe some or all of the rent the landlord claims.
By grafting the new rights onto the existing statutory eviction procedures, which
in most jurisdictions were already required to be heard and decided on an accelerated schedule, the legislatures and courts could hope for quick action against
67

Schier, supra note 21, at 227.
Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
69
Beattie, supra note 21, at 242-44.
70
Rose & Scott, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 968 n.8. ―[G]rievances related to
housing were important factors‖ fomenting discontent and leading to the riots. REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL DISORDERS 472-73 (1968).
71
See, e.g., Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202 (Vt. 1984)(recognizing affirmative suit to recover rent
previously paid).
72
Put another way, less expected benefit will make defensive invocation of the warranty costeffective than will be required to justify an affirmative suit.
68
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non-repairing landlords. Speed is important not just for humanitarian reasons but
also to give tenants sufficient incentives to assert their new rights in court. Faced
with the prospect of a protracted legal battle with their landlords before they
would have any hope of getting repairs, most tenants in houses and apartments
with serious health and safety hazards would be much more inclined to move.
Inducing landlords to repair their units, however, is by no means as simple as
revising substantive legal rules. The effectiveness of the reforms in changing
landlords’ behavior depends on changing landlords’ economic incentives, which
in turn depends in part on how effective low-income tenants are in asserting their
new rights in court. Landlords will have no incentive to maintain their units unless the cost of failing to do so exceeds the cost of repairs. The cost of failing to
repair in the new legal regime depended upon four factors: the probability that a
tenant in a substandard unit would assert her or his new legal rights, the probability that the tenant would be successful in doing so, the cost of being held liable
for failure to repair, and any increase in the building’s value resulting from the
repairs. Thus, repairing is only likely to be economically superior to ignoring a
violation if:
(ProbabilityTenant asserts warranty x ProbabilityTenant prevails x CostLoss) + ValueBuilding
> CostRepairs
The landlord’s incentive to repair depends heavily upon the actions of both the
tenant and the court.73 In addition, both the landlord’s actions and their consequences, for tenants and for the housing stock, depend on several crucial assumptions about housing markets and the nature of contemporary poverty. This section examines these prerequisites to the new regime’s success.
1. Tenants’ Propensity to Assert the Warranty of Habitability
The probability that the tenant in an ill-repaired unit will assert the warranty
of habitability depends on the tenant knowing about the warranty, knowing how
to raise it, and deciding that doing so is in her or his interest. Thus, increasing
the number of low-income tenants that are aware of the warranty of habitability
and know how to assert it will tend to increase the likelihood that landlords will
feel motivated to make repairs. Who might provide this information, however, is
an open question. The appellate courts that announced the warranty of habitabil73

The state of the real estate market in the area is also important. The repairs are more likely to add
to the value of the property if the location is desirable enough to compete for tenants or buyers that
would pay more for a better-maintained structure. In depressed areas, tenants may simply lack the
funds to pay more rent for a better unit: their demand curve may become almost perfectly elastic at
some point. For example, when the author worked as a legal services lawyer in impoverished
North Philadelphia, his clients’ rent typically was five or ten dollars per month below the maximum
public assistance grant amount. In this sense, then, the warranty of habitability is most likely to
prove effective not in the troubled neighborhoods that typify deteriorating housing conditions to
many but in more affluent areas where market forces already are providing landlords significant
motivation.
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ity in most states generally lack the facilities and inclination to conduct community legal education.74 State legislatures could, but even in those where landlords’
influence was insufficient to block the warranty of habitability may not be able to
go farther to fund outreach campaigns. Legal services and community organizations concerned about housing quality have done outreach in some areas, but
these efforts are uneven and typically underfunded. Ultimately, awareness of the
warranty depends heavily upon tenants learning about it through word-of-mouth.
And the likelihood that tenants aware of the warranty will pass that information
along likely depends on how useful the warranty has seemed to them: tenants that
have won repairs or financial recompense from their landlords are much more
likely to think the information is worth sharing.
Even if a tenant in a badly repaired unit knows about the implied warranty,
she or he may not know how effectively to raise it. Initiating an action – framing
a complaint, filing the complaint and either paying the filing fee or an adequate
motion for a fee waiver, arranging service of process, and so forth – is more demanding for the novice litigant than asserting a defense, but even the latter can be
a challenge. Some courts require written answers,75 which pro se litigants may
not know how to generate. Even those courts that allow tenants to respond orally
in open court on a particular day require a presence and sense of timing that pro
se litigants are likely to lack: the tenant may have only a few seconds to decide
what to say, and the judge’s cue (such as ―is this the amount you owe?‖) may
steer tenants into responding to the landlord’s accounting rather than raising an
affirmative defense that may seem unresponsive. If the tenant does not understand what to say and when, her or his abstract awareness of the defense will be
for naught.
The knowledgeable tenant might decide to raise the warranty of habitability
under either of two very different sets of circumstances. First, the tenant could
raise the warranty deliberately to obtain either financial recompense or performance of the landlord’s duty to repair. Alternatively, a tenant in financial distress who has failed to pay rent for other reasons – lack of funds or other pressing
priorities – may raise the warranty in an effort to rescue her or his tenancy. This
subsection shows that tenants who become defendants in nonpayment actions involuntarily are far more likely to assert the warranty and thus that the tenants’
rights revolution’s instrumental success depends heavily on their success. Yet as
part III.A, infra, explains, little-appreciated substantive doctrines have prevented
precisely these tenants from asserting the warranty.
a. Deliberate Rent Withholding

74

General consumer protection laws may require landlords to give tenants some information about
their rights when seeking to collect rent. Mary B. Spector, Tenants’ Rights, Procedural Wrongs:
Summary Eviction and the Need for Reform, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 135, 207-08 (2000).
75
BOSTON HOUSING CT. R. 3 (2009); Catelli v. Fleetwood, 842 A.2d 1078 (R.I. 2004).
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The rationality of deliberately asserting the warranty depends on the likelihood that the tenant will be successful, the direct rewards (such as a rent
abatement) the tenant will receive for being successful, the likelihood that the
assertion of the repairs will cause the landlord to repair, the value of the repairs,
and the costs the tenant will bear in raising the warranty. A tenant who knows
about the warranty will rationally choose deliberate rent withholding over the
option of continuing to pay and endure the defects, when:
(ProbTenant prevails x ValueDamages
ValueRepairs) > CostsLitigation

for prevailing tenant)

+ (ProbTenant

prevails

x ProbRepairs x

The costs of litigation include, of course, the direct costs of advancing a
defense based on the warranty: time lost from work or other activities, fees and
costs the court charges, any costs to obtain legal advice or representation,
gathering evidence, etc. The costs of litigating also include the chance that the
tenant will not prevail and will have to move hurriedly. Finally, they include the
chance that the landlord, although losing in the initial action, will retaliate against
the tenant by terminating her or his lease, raising the rent, changing the locks, or
taking other actions that injure the tenant or induce her or him to move. 76 Thus,
the aware tenant of substandard housing can be expected to benefit more from
raising the warranty of habitability than from suffering in silence when:
(ProbTenant prevails in initial action x ValueDamages for prevailing tenant) + (ProbTenant prevails in initial
action x ProbRepairs x ValueRepairs) > ((1-ProbTenant prevails in initial action) x (CostMoving +
ValueCurrent dwelling – ValueNew dwelling)) + (ProbTenant prevails in initial action x (1-ProbTenant
avoids retaliation) x (CostMoving + ValueCurrent dwelling – ValueNew dwelling)) + Direct
CostLitigation
In fact, however, tenants have a third alternative besides raising the warranty
of habitability and putting up with the defects: they can move. Therefore, the
rational tenant will only withhold rent when both the expected value of doing so
is positive and that expected value is greater than that of moving:
(ProbTenant prevails in initial action x ValueDamages for prevailing tenant) + (ProbTenant prevails in initial
action x ProbRepairs x ValueRepairs) – ((1-ProbTenant prevails in initial action) x (CostMoving +
ValueCurrent dwelling – ValueNew dwelling)) – (ProbTenant prevails in initial action x (1-ProbTenant

76

The landlord may evict the tenant even more suddenly through self-help. In most jurisdictions,
this is unlawful. But under a similar calculation, a landlord may conclude that the likelihood of the
tenant suing and winning, and the amount the tenant is likely to recover in such a suit, is insufficient to dissuade her or him from engaging in self-help.
The tenant’s burdens of litigation also include losses of value in the leasehold from the landlord’s unpleasant actions that fall short of compelling the tenant to move.
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x (CostMoving + ValueCurrent dwelling – ValueNew
CostLitigation > CostMoving + ValueCurrent dwelling – ValueNew dwelling
avoids retaliation)

dwelling))

– Direct

The appearance of moving costs (including the relative quality of their current
and prospective dwellings) on both sides of this calculation leads to something of
a paradox. The expected value of asserting the warranty is more likely to be
positive if the tenant is relatively willing to move. But if the tenant is willing to
move quickly if the warranty-based defense fails,77 or if the landlord retaliates
successfully, then moving could prove a more reliable and efficient method of escaping a substandard dwelling.78
Thus, in a market where moving is fairly inexpensive, tenants in bad housing
might be less afraid to fight but still prefer to move because they have a substantial chance of finding better housing. There, tenants’ mobility rather than the
warranty of habitability is likely to be the principal engine driving improvements
in housing quality. This does not seem problematic, as the ease of moving suggests that, at least in the short-term, the market is functioning reasonably well.
On the other hand, in a tight housing market, tenants of substandard housing
may not feel they dare assert the warranty because the likelihood they will end up
somewhere worse is high. As a result, for the warranty of habitability to have a
significant impact on housing conditions, raising it may need to be affirmatively
attractive or only modestly costly; simply making it less costly than enduring defective housing likely will not suffice. This requires highly favorable values for
the other elements in the calculation, including the tenant’s chances of winning in
the initial action and in avoiding retaliation, the damages (or rent abatement)
awarded, and the likelihood that the landlord will repair. As subsection 2 shows,
infra, this is quite unlikely.
The importance of moving costs in this calculation also tends to skew the warranty’s impact in favor of less-poor tenants, undermining the reforms’ instrumental goals. For many of the poorest tenants, a significant part of the cost of mov77

Indeed, even if the tenant’s defense succeeds, the landlord or code enforcement authorities may
require the tenant to move to facilitate repairs. Knott v. Laythe, 674 N.E.2d 660 (Mass. App.
1997); Creekside Apartments v. Poteat, 446 S.E.2d 826 (N.C. App. 1994); see Lau v. Bautista, 598
P.2d 161 (Haw. 1979) (finding a statutory right to relocation assistance in such a case); cf., Allen v.
Lee, 538 N.E.2d 1073 (Ohio. App. 1987) (affirming award of moving costs against landlord).
78
Moreover, moving on the tenant’s own timetable is likely to be less costly, both in direct costs
and in the tenant’s ability to obtain better new housing, than hurried moving should the tenant lose
the initial case or the landlord effectively retaliate. See Chester Hartman & David Robinson, Evictions: The Hidden Housing Problem, 14 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 461 (2003)(finding correlation between forced evictions and homelessness); Nan Marie Astone & Sara S. McLanahan, Family
Structure, Residential Mobility, and School Dropout, 31 DEMOGRAPHY 574 (1994)(finding that
greater residential mobility explains much of the higher drop-out rate of children in step-parent
families). Evictions commonly bring severe collateral consequences. Mary Spector, Tenant
Stories: Obstacles and Challenges Facing Tenants Today, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 407 (2006).
Thus, ease of moving is more likely to make departure appealing than it is to make the risk of
withholding rent acceptable.
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ing is finding the funds to make a deposit on a new dwelling before they receive
back their deposit on their current unit. Whether they borrow in the illicit credit
market or expend one of the finite favors they can call in from family or friends,
the effective interest rate is likely to be exorbitant. Less-poor clients may either
be able to pay the second deposit themselves or have access to cheaper credit.79
As a result, less impoverished tenants, who may be living in units with less
severe problems, may nonetheless be more willing to chance raising the warranty
of habitability. Because poorer tenants are most likely to live in substandard
housing, the reduced likelihood that they will feel comfortable raising the warranty of habitability is likely to reduce the warranty’s effectiveness in remedying
the worst housing conditions.
Several additional observations are in order here. First, not only does increasing the likelihood that tenants with meritorious claims will prevail increase the
likelihood that other tenants will become aware of the warranties, it also increases the likelihood that aware tenants will elect to press claims based upon
those warranties by increasing their expectations of the success of doing so.
Thus, the success rate of tenants in substandard dwellings is doubly important in
persuading landlords to prefer repairing to litigation.80
Second, this calculus is unlikely to yield the same result for all repairs or all
landlords. Defects that are relatively inexpensive to fix, either because of their
nature or because a particular landlord has an efficient system for making repairs,
are more likely to be repaired even in a system that generates insufficient pressure to make costlier repairs cost-effective. Conversely, the costs to the landlord
of losing, and the value to the tenant of winning, a case under the warranty of
habitability presumably should vary with the severity of the defect. The severity
of a defect’s impact on the tenant’s enjoyment of the premises will not always
correspond to the cost of repairing them: exposed wiring could cause horrific
harm to small children yet be inexpensive to repair, while repairing an isolated
unevenness in the floor that creates a slight tripping hazard might require ripping
up the entire floor and replacing support beams below. The warranty thus will
tend to promote cost-beneficial repairs just as a well-functioning market would.
Some defects also may be more difficult or costly for tenants to prove, such as inadequate heat or some kinds of infestation. Landlords that might repair obvious
holes in walls and exposed wiring might prefer to contest claims of defects that
cannot as readily be photographed. This effect may mimic the effects of information costs in a market.81
79

To be sure, less-poor tenants may have more possessions that would need to be moved and that
could be lost or damaged in a move. They also might lose more wages if they must miss work to
move. Nonetheless, these costs seem unlikely to have the deterrent effect that the risk of homelessness can have on lower-income tenants.
80
On the other hand, if many tenants prevail on unsound assertions of the warranty of habitability,
landlords may conclude that repairing will not help to avoid such losses.
81
See Rabin, supra note 14, at 580 (endorsing the implied warranty only for latent defects).
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Third, the value of any repairs increases with the number of months the tenant
remains in the dwelling. Most repairs require many months of enjoyment before
they are cost-effective. Therefore, the strength and duration of tenants’ protection against evictions in retaliation are pivotal to the results.82
Finally, tenants’ behavior in these matters is unlikely to be consistently rational. As one long-time tenants’ lawyer remarked, ―nothing gets people where
they live like getting them where they live.‖ Thus, some tenants may be extremely risk-averse and decline to pursue the warranty even if the actuarial value
of doing so exceeds that of passivity. Conversely, some tenants may become so
incensed about a landlord’s failure to repair – particularly if they see defects in
their unit threatening the well-being of their children – that they may tilt at their
landlords despite meager prospects for success. Nonetheless, given the high
stakes, most tenants, particularly the poorest tenants, are likely to be quite riskaverse and hesitant to confront their landlords over repairs unless the balance of
risks and benefits seems heavily in favor of doing so. Absent a high likelihood of
success, or heavy financial penalties against landlords for the failure to repair,
this will be difficult to achieve, particularly for tenants in the worst housing.
b. Raising the Warranty to Defend Unintended Arrearages
The strong reasons why tenants in defective housing may not raise the warranty of habitability as part of a deliberate strategy makes the warranty’s effectiveness in improving housing conditions depend largely on tenants raising the
warranty to defend non-intentional rent arrearages. If the tenant lacks the money
to pay the contract rent, she or he no longer has the option of staying and putting
up with the defect. This makes the costs of moving less determinative: whether
the tenant raises the warranty and fails or raises no defense at all, she or he is
likely to have to move by approximately the same date.83 Even if the tenant
prevails and then becomes subject to the landlord’s retaliation, she or he will
surely have at least somewhat longer to move – as well as whatever rent abatement she or he won. Thus, a tenant’s risk aversion, which plays a crucial role in
determining which tenants will deliberately withhold rent, is largely irrelevant to
82

Many states prohibit retaliatory terminations to buttress code enforcement programs and the new
tenants’ rights. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 699-703 (D.C. Cir. 1968); URLTA § 5.101.
Proving the landlords’ motives is difficult, however, particularly for pro se tenants and those in
systems without meaningful discovery. Kathleen Eldergill, The Connecticut Housing Court: An
Initial Evaluation, 12 CONN. L. REV. 296, 311-12 (1980). Courts may presume the legitimacy of
landlords’ terminations, in all cases or those not immediately following the tenants’ assertion of
rights. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-20 (2007)(prohibiting rent increases, service cuts, or
evictions within six months of a tenant’s efforts to enforce housing codes); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.5720(2) (West 2008)(presuming non-retaliation if landlord waits ninety days to evict
the tenant).
83
In many states, statute fixes the length of time a tenant has to move after the landlord wins possession. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5744 (West 2000)(allowing ten days to move
after judgment). Thus, even if the tenant alienates the landlord or the court by raising the warranty,
the court has little opportunity to punish the tenant.
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whether she or he will raise the warranty to defend an inadvertent arrearage. In
addition, because these tenants need only learn of the implied warranty before
they respond to the landlord’s eviction action, the courts have greater ability to
ensure that they are informed in the early stages of the proceeding.84
As a result, a rational tenant in substandard housing who has fallen behind on
rent and is aware of the warranty of habitability will invoke it if the expected
gains from appearing and defending exceed the costs of doing so (perhaps lost
time from work, child care costs, or transportation expenses):85
(ProbTenant prevails in initial action x ValueDamages for prevailing tenant) + (ProbTenant prevails in initial
action x ProbRepairs x ValueRepairs) > Direct CostLitigation
These direct costs are only a subset of the costs tenants contemplating deliberate
withholding must weigh, meaning that a much more modest rate of success in the
courts may justify expending modest litigation costs. On the other hand, the
value of rent abatements awarded involuntary defendants may be lower than that
for deliberate rent withholders. The latter will benefit from any rent abatement,
large or small. An impoverished tenant who could not afford to pay the contract
rent, on the other hand, will only benefit from a rent abatement that is large
enough to bring the cost of redeeming possession within her or his means. Thus,
for example, an eight hundred dollar abatement from a thousand dollar rent claim
may seem very favorable for the tenant. But if the tenant lacks the remaining two
hundred dollars to redeem possession, she or he will have to move just as surely
as if she or he had won no abatement at all.
Thus, impoverished tenants raising the warranty defensively after falling behind on her or his rent involuntarily are pivotal to the success of the warranty of
habitability. This aligns tenants’ incentives well with the new regime’s housing
quality aims: unlike the case of tenants contemplating deliberate withholding, involuntary defendants in the worst housing presumably have the greatest chances
of success.86 And as involuntary defendants likely are poorer as a group than deliberate rent withholders, their stronger incentives to raise the warranty comport
with the reforms redistributive and humanitarian goals.
84

The Michigan Supreme Court found an innovative approach by inserting information on these
rights on summonses used in Detroit for eviction cases and on optional form notices to quit the
courts made available to landlords. See Rose & Scott, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.,
at 1019-23. After a few years, when reorganizing the Detroit courts, the justices did not require the
new court designated to handle eviction cases in that city to retain the informational forms. See also
Lynn Cunningham, Procedural Due Process Aspects of District of Columbia Eviction Procedures,
7 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 107, 113-14 (2005)(arguing for requirement that landlords plead
compliance with the implied warranty).
85
Indeed, invoking the warranty might induce the landlord to settle for additional time to move.
This at least modestly increases landlords’ costs of not repairing.
86
To be sure, non-repairing landlords only feel losses attributable to the warranty of habitability if
their tenants redeem possession. As noted, involuntary defendants may be less likely to do so.
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2. Courts’ Propensity to Rule for Tenants on Repair Defenses
In addition to its direct impact on non-repairing landlords’ incentives, the rate
of success that tenants of substandard housing enjoy when raising the warranty of
habitability is crucial both to spreading word of that defense within the tenant
community and to inducing other tenants to assert the warranty. Uniform application of new standards may be essential to improving housing quality without
raising rents.87
As an analytical matter, this should be fairly straightforward: the new rules
are not conceptually difficult to apply. Institutionally, however, the tenants’
rights revolution imposed stresses the courts hearing eviction cases were illequipped to handle. Adapting to the new legal regime presented several distinct
problems. First, hearing these cases would demand far greater resources than had
been required to grant possession routinely to landlords under a legal regime
where tenants had few defenses. Second, trying disputes about housing
conditions required very different skills than many of these courts previously had
employed. And third, the judges hearing landlord-tenant disputes had to be
willing to rule against landlords that had almost invariably prevailed in their
courts under the prior regime.
In the old regime, most tenants had no defenses to eviction.88 The few contested cases that did arise – typically challenges to the landlord’s accounting – generally could be resolved with documents. As a result, few judicial resources were
required to resolve large numbers of cases quickly.
The new defenses of failure to repair and retaliatory eviction required considerably more judicial resources. Because the condition of the tenant’s dwelling, or
the landlord’s intent in terminating the tenancy, could raise genuine issues of
fact, the right to a jury trial suddenly was no longer hypothetical. Although these
cases remained quite simple relative even to the small civil cases and misdemeanors the same courts typically handled, the increased demand for adjudicatory resources still confronted these courts with difficult choices.
Taking a broad view, appellate courts and legislatures imposed the implied
warranty of habitability in significant part to make up for the failure of housing
code enforcement. That failure resulted in significant part from a lack of adjudicatory resources for code enforcement. The new landlord-tenant regime shifted
this excess demand for adjudicatory resources to the courts. Judicial adjudication, however, is much costlier than administrative processes: more people are
involved, judges and some clerks likely are better-paid than inspectors, suitable
courtrooms must be constructed and maintained, etc. The transfer therefore increased the aggregate shortfall in resources.89 Neither the legislatures, which
87

Ackerman, supra note 60, at 1108.
Cf., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 64-65 (1972) (discussing ―those recurring cases where the
tenant fails to pay rent or holds over after the expiration of his tenancy and the issue in the ensuing
litigation is simply whether he has paid or held over‖).
89
To the extent the problem with administrative housing code enforcement was corruption, transfer88
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could have created and funded new judgeships, nor the appellate courts, which
might have diverting resources from other classes of cases, typically recognized
this crucial condition to the success of the new legal regime they were creating.90
Similarly, neither have much attention to the procedural reforms needed to make
the courts accessible to unsophisticated pro se tenants.91
Few of the courts that were given the responsibility of carrying out the policies embodied in the reforms had experience handling cases of major public
policy import. Many had dockets dominated by traffic tickets, criminal arraignments, and routine debt collection actions. By necessity, these courts had become specialists more in the art of processing cases in volume than in resolving
fine points of justice in individual cases. Judges themselves admitted they dispensed ―assembly-line justice.‖92 Some of the skills and techniques useful for
efficient processing of large numbers of cases were antithetical to the goal of
finding facts, even relatively simple ones, in each case. The rapid use of jargon
and opaque procedures may seem relatively innocent when the bewildered
tenants had no defenses to raise. Similarly, when the result in the courtroom was
virtually a foregone conclusion, having clerks explain that result to parties and
encourage them to go home – leaving the court to enter a default judgment –
could save everyone time.
For tenants to assert defenses based on the warranty or retaliation effectively,
however, they must understand the proceedings. The amounts of money involved are likely to make retained counsel infeasible. Although the warranty
came into being at about the same time legal services funding was at its apogee,
these programs never had the resources to represent more than a small fraction of
the number of tenants being evicted from substandard housing.93 And those
tenants with meritorious defenses commonly were among the least sophisti-

ring those responsibilities to the courts might have helped. Nonetheless, even without being corrupt, the landlord-tenant courts remain disproportionately vulnerable to influence from landlords
and their lawyers, who typically are repeat players.
90
Many other categories in their caseloads, however, had a far higher incidence of representation on
both sides; those lawyers could be expected to exert political pressure if they felt their interests
being slighted. Other categories lacking representation, such as traffic tickets, already may have
been handled on a mass basis with few additional resources available to be skimmed.
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By contrast, those seeking to reform government transfer programs have paid keen attention to
procedural denials of substantive rights. David A. Super, The Quiet “Welfare” Revolution:
Resurrecting the Food Stamp Program in the Wake of the 1996 Welfare Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1271, 1351-70 (2004); Super, Invisible Hand, supra note 40, at 862-74.
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Rose & Scott, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 988 n.88.
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Even with a legal aid office across the hallway from Detroit Landlord-Tenant Court, fewer than
ten percent of tenants in 1975 had lawyers. Rose & Scott, at 993, 1000. Legal services never came
close to being a ―responsive entitlement‖ committed to serving all eligible people with meritorious
cases. See David A. Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 633, 642
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cated,94 tenants. Many of these tenants inevitably become confused at times,
requiring judges and clerks to decide how much they are comfortable explaining
consistent with their view of the adversary process.
Finally, implementing the new tenants’ defenses required a profound transformation of courthouse culture. Larger landlords, and many landlords’ lawyers, are
repeat players, well-known to judges and clerks.95 Under the old regime, the
landlord receiving judgment in virtually every case was a part of the pattern governing their interactions, almost as much as the salutation ―your honor.‖ With
few cases requiring judicial discretion, some judges and clerks may have seen little harm in relaxing the barriers separating them from landlords and their counsel. These relationships may have seemed symbiotic: cooperative relationships
with landlords and their lawyers could facilitate the expeditious disposition of
large dockets. Elected judges may have come to expect the support of the landlords’ bar, and that bar may have seemed a natural pool from which to draw new
judges. Repeat litigants may be among the relatively few non-court personnel
from whom judges may hope to receive the respect and deference that often must
substitute for financial compensation. Lacking many of the trappings, and interesting cases, of higher courts, this value should not be underestimated. Thus,
some courts may be as vulnerable to ―capture‖ by repeat players nominally subject to their jurisdiction as are administrative agencies.96 Even when not dealing
with repeat players, the assumption that landlords were entitled to win virtually
all cases may have induced judges and clerks to assist confused landlords in
making out the elements of their claims.97
Although landlords had no legally cognizable interest in a substantive legal
regime that assured them of virtually complete success, the social reliance interests on all sides likely were immense. Reasserting formal roles, much less holding trials on matters that previously had been routine and rendering judgments
against familiar landlords, risked the perception of personal slights. This inevitably required considerable readjustment by all concerned. And some judges
might find demeaning the prospect of simplifying and explaining the proceedings
to make them more intelligible to unsophisticated pro se tenants.
In addition to being trustees for finite pools of adjudicatory resources, courts
also can be seen as vendors of services to landlords. As such, they are vulnerable
to competitive pressures. If the new tenants’ rights made evictions too burdensome, many landlords might abandon the courts and seek to evict their tenants
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themselves through (generally illegal) self-help tactics.98 Judges could be understood for wanting to avoid the resulting chaos and the violence that would likely
entail. Judges also could be expected to resent the loss of prestige as litigants
abandon their courts.
Thus, instead of concentrating single-mindedly on adapting the courts to implement the new reforms, judges had to worry about the effect the reforms might
have on their dockets, on their roles, and on the attitudes of landlords. These
worries undoubtedly diminished the enthusiasm with which many courts
welcomed their new roles implementing the public policies against bad housing
conditions and in favor of increased bargaining power for tenants.
3. Assumptions about Housing Markets and Poverty
Achieving any of the reforms’ instrumental goals depends on housing economics. In particular, any plausible scenario in which the reforms could improve
housing conditions, redistribute wealth, or even ameliorate humanitarian crises
depends on a plausible explanation of why low-income tenants cannot obtain better housing by spending more in the existing market. The reforms’ advocates
divided between two theories. Some maintained that the housing market was
somehow flawed in such a way that increased spending – at least within the
ranges of which most low-income tenants were capable – could not reliably bring
better housing conditions. In this view, rents exceeded those that a well-functioning market would produce,99 and landlords were far more profitable than
generally recognized.100 The task, then, was to redistribute some of that surplus
to tenants. The alternative explanation is that the market was reflecting lowincome tenants’ preferences: as much as they might dislike their decrepit
dwellings, they would dislike even more the reductions in food, utility service, or
other necessities required to pay for any increase in their consumption of
housing. Put simply, low-income tenants suffered bad housing conditions because they were too poor to afford anything more.
On closer examination, the market failure theory proves difficult to support
except in small submarkets or for relatively short intervals. It also has a paradoxical effect on tenants’ propensity to raise the implied warranty. Yet if one
concludes that low-income tenants’ poverty is the reason they cannot avoid bad
housing conditions, the warranty of habitability could easily cause them more
harm than good. And if housing markets operate competitively in the mediumand long-term, pressing landlords to repair could cause units to depart, either
upward or downward, from the low-cost rental market.
a. Bad Housing Conditions as a Result of Market Failure
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Those claiming failure in the housing markets had some difficulty specifying
the nature of that failure. Some argued that many urban housing markets had low
vacancy rates and suggested that this meant tenants suffered from a lack of competition among landlords. A true lack of competition – a market controlled by
one or a few suppliers who can insist on prices above competitive equilibrium –
is indeed a market failure, but ownership of rental housing is more scattered than
that in most other major consumer markets.101 Low vacancy rates do not mean a
lack of competition. Vacant housing causes losses for its owners, which they
naturally seek to avoid.102 A market with low vacancy rates may be one in which
supply has matched demand closely. Moreover, many cities actually had relatively high vacancy rates during the period when the implied warranty was winning recognition.
Others argued that low-income tenants lacked the sophistication to bargain effectively with their landlords, suffering a kind of information failure.103 This creates something of a paradox. As noted above, the implied warranty of habitability’s effectiveness depends in significant part on tenants’ sophistication in learning about the warranty and navigating court procedures to assert it effectively.
The more arduous those procedures are, the more they will deny relief to tenants
whose lack of sophistication has exposed them to the information failures hypothesized to justify the imposition of the warranty. Thus, the tenants best able to
assert the warranty are likely to be among those least affected by this market failure. Put another way, if this market failure hypothesis is correct, the warranty of
habitability will prove ineffectual because tenants in substandard housing will be
unlikely to raise it.
A more sophisticated argument for some market failure focuses on time.
Housing takes a fairly long time to enter the market, leaving the short-term housing supply relatively inelastic.104 Some of the reforms’ advocates argued that this
inelasticity could be fairly persistent due to land use controls, building codes,
expensive ―union featherbedding,‖ and other factors.105 They did not identify the
surge in demand to which the market was failing to respond: if anything, the
decades following World War II saw a rapid shrinkage in demand for rental
housing in central cities as much of the middle-class became suburban homeowners. Moreover, this theory creates another paradox because tenants’ propensity to assert the warranty also depends on their willingness to move if that assertion is ineffective. If tenants’ positions in the market are precarious, they presumably will be highly averse to moving. A tenant forced to move rapidly after
101

Ackerman, supra note 60, at 1099-1100, 1149-50.
Rabin, supra note 14, at 576.
103
Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability on Low-Income Housing:
“Milking” and Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 485, 497-98 (1987).
104
Conversely, discrimination may prevent slum landlords from exiting to compete in more upscale
rental markets. Ackerman, at 1102.
105
Rose & Scott, at 977.
102

23

losing an eviction case will be among the most vulnerable to short-term market
conditions. This paradox is partially ameliorated for impoverished tenants raising the warranty when other financial setbacks make them involuntary defendants in eviction proceedings. These tenants still, however, must master court
procedure sufficiently to assert the warranty effectively in defending their failure
to pay rent.
b. Bad Housing Conditions as a Result of Poverty
If low-income tenants’ inability to secure better housing is attributed not to
market failure but simply to their poverty, the warranty of habitability would be
designed to cause low-income tenants to increase their consumption of housing.
In theory, causing low-income tenants to increase their consumption of housing
need not be redistributive.106 It could, instead, represent a judgment that they
would be better off in superior housing even if they had to sacrifice other expenditures to pay for it.107 Yet forcing tenants to endure hunger in order to live in
better apartments is hardly consistent with the 1960s notion of expanding individual rights: it is at once paternalistic, inefficient, and cruel. Therefore, the
implied warranty of habitability likely would not have attracted any significant
number of adherents absent some argument that low-income tenants could
receive better housing without reducing their ability to purchase other necessities.
The implied warranty’s advocates developed several theories about why landlords under some circumstances might be compelled to absorb the added costs of
improved maintenance, neither raising rents or shrinking the supply of low-rent
housing;108 critics staunchly rejected this view.109
Allowing low-income tenants to consume more housing for the same level of
expenditures could happen if the housing supply function shifted to provide more
housing at each price. The standard cause for supply curves to shift to the right is
a reduction in the costs of production. Federal housing policy had ambiguous effects. During the three decades after World War II, the federal government subsidized the cost of supplying housing by constructing public housing. The white
middle-class’s heavily subsidized abandonment of the inner-cities similarly
swelled the supply of rental housing. Beginning in the Nixon Administration,
however, the federal government began to change from subsidizing supply to
subsidizing individual tenants’ purchases of housing through Section 8 vouchers
and certificates. This allowed the minority of low-income tenants receiving
vouchers and certificates to pay more for housing without sacrificing other expenditures, but it also increased aggregate demand, counteracting the effects of
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the growth in supply. Some writers suggested that social segregation would stifle
demand for housing in areas regarded as slums and inhibit landlords from exiting
to compete in higher-priced markets.110
The courts adopting the tenants’ rights reforms had no way to affect the supply of low-rent housing directly.111 State legislatures might have, but state-level
social spending initiatives of this scale were rare in this period, and the federal
government had assumed the mantle of housing financing. Thus, states’ ability
to increase low-income tenants’ consumption of housing depended on finding
and exploiting some flaw in the housing market that would prevent landlords
from charging low-income tenants more for improved housing.112 It also presumably depended at least on not adversely affecting the supply of low-rent housing.
At least three features of the housing market in some places may prevent landlords from passing along the costs of repairs compelled under the warranty of
habitability.113 First, some urban areas have rent control. The fraction of the
low-income housing market covered by rent control, however, was modest even
when the tenants’ rights revolution was taking shape and has steadily declined
since. Still, if landlords must make repairs and may not by law increase rents,
they must either continue to operate at a reduced profit or take the unit off the
market.
Second, a similar effect can be achieved by fixed public assistance grant
levels. If the maximum monthly welfare grant for a family of three is $400, and
a substantial fraction of low-income tenants receive welfare, landlords may not
be able to charge more than that amount for two-bedroom units whose size or
location will not attract middle-income renters. Thus, the demand function is effectively discontinuous, with demand in the lowest segment almost perfectly
elastic with respect to price at the levels corresponding to public assistance grant
levels.114 The effect is somewhat similar to that of rent control: if the warranty
compels a landlord to make repairs and the elasticity of demand at the public assistance grant level prevents the landlord from recovering those costs, the landlord may have to choose between reduced profits and making enough improvements to the unit to appeal to a higher segment of the rental market.
Finally, a large proportion of landlords’ costs are fixed. The landlord incurs
the cost of the capital invested in the unit, property taxes, insurance, the expenses
of roof repairs and at least enough heat to keep the pipes from freezing whether
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the unit is occupied or not. Therefore, in the short-term, landlords have a strong
incentive not to raise rents to the point where the unit might fall vacant: even a
very low rent should more than cover the landlord’s marginal costs associated
with having the unit occupied. Even in the medium-term, a very slight rate of
return on the landlord’s original investment might be superior to exiting the
market.115 Thus, in a housing market with a substantial vacancy rate, the landlord
in the near-term may have to absorb at least a substantial portion of the additional
cost of repairs.
None of these are altogether satisfactory. The first two affect only small segments of the rental housing market, and none of the three is reliable beyond the
short-term. In addition, even if these or other factors prevent landlords from
passing along the full cost of additional repairs, tenants may not be better off.
Low-income tenants with very tight budgets may face serious hardship if their
housing costs increase even if the value they receive increases far more. 116
Getting a $5,000 ocean cruise for $100 sounds like a great deal – unless that $100
is needed to prevent a utility shut-off, to pay for cardiac medication, or the like.
Moreover, even where market conditions prevent increases in price, they
typically lead to a reduction in the quantity supplied when the costs of production
rise. Even if landlords could not raise rents in the near term, a reduction in the
supply of low-cost housing could result in overcrowding, homelessness, and
tenants’ exiting the affected market to try to compete for housing in higher-cost
or physically remote rental markets.
Even if landlords cannot pass along all, or even some, of the cost of repairs,
they have two additional options in the medium- and long-term besides defying
the warranty or making the repairs the warranty commands. They may disinvest
in the property to the point that it falls out of the rental market completely
through abandonment or arson. Or they may make substantial new investment in
the property to move it out of the lowest-rent segment of the market.
Thus, the landlords’ decision function described above is incomplete: it considers only two of at least four options.117 To improve the lives of tenants, the
option of repairing must not only become more attractive to landlords than ignoring the implied warranty, it must also prevail over both disinvestment and mov115
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ing the unit into a higher-cost housing market, either as a rental or through conversion to a condominium or cooperative. Indeed, enough landlords must decide
to repair for the improvement in tenants’ lives to offset the harm experienced by
those that were unsuccessful in asserting the warranty of habitability (and thus
lost the costs of litigation and the economic and non-economic costs of moving)
as well as the adverse consequences of reducing the supply of low-cost
housing.118
Here, too, a paradox arises affecting tenants’ propensity to assert the warranty. If a significant number of landlords remove units from the market rather
than repairing them, the supply of low-rent housing will decline, the cost of moving will increase, and fewer tenants will be inclined to assert the warranty. More
generally, as the low-rent housing market tightens, any economic pressures on
landlords to maintain their dwellings as a way of attracting tenants – as well as
market pressures not to raise rents to cover the costs of repairs or otherwise – will
largely disappear. Decrepit housing may well disappear, which may satisfy those
who saw the warranty as a response to urban blight. But the results will bitterly
disappoint redistributionalists and humanitarians, who will see the benefit of improved housing accrue not to low-income tenants but to middle- and upperincome gentrifiers.
III. FLAWS IN THE NEW REGIME
As the preceding Part indicates, the implied warranty’s success in improving
housing conditions or in improving the well-being of tenants in decrepit housing
depends upon a series of factors, several of which are highly problematic. Those
tenants most affected may not be aware of their rights, may lack the sophistication to assert those rights effectively, or may not choose to press their landlord to
comply by raising the warranty either because they are unwilling to risk having
to move or because they are too eager to move to invest resources fighting over
their current abode. The warranty’s effectiveness therefore is likely to depend
heavily upon having tenants raise the warranty defensively after falling behind on
their rent. Even then, the ability of very low-level courts to transform the way
they handle landlord-tenant cases is pivotal.
The attention devoted to the broad strokes of reforming substantive landlordtenant law, however, was not matched with similar focus on the finer points of
the doctrine or to the procedural and institutional steps required to ensure that the
implied warranty would improve either substandard housing or the lives of the
tenants of those units. The resulting problems have resulted in extremely low
rates of success for tenants with meritorious claims under the implied warranty of
habitability. In particular, these policies have tended to prevent tenants from
118
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raising the implied warranty defensively. Given the difficulty, described in the
previous Part, of inducing tenants to challenge their landlords’ repair records
deliberately, excluding impoverished tenants defending non-payment actions has
undermined the new regime of landlord-tenant law severely, rendering it irrelevant or even counter-productive with respect to many of the problems it set out to
address. Moreover, the regime’s failure has disproportionately afflicted the lowest-income tenants whose plight helped drive the transformation of the substantive law.
Section A describes two important sets of formal limitations on tenants’ ability to assert the implied warranty of habitability, one substantive, the other procedural. Section B then summarizes what is known about how the courts actually
handled eviction cases under the new legal regime. It finds an array of procedural obstacles have rendered the implied warranty of habitability almost irrelevant in practice, with tenants prevailing far too rarely to induce other tenants to
learn about and raise the new defenses or to induce landlords to increase their
maintenance efforts.
A. Formal Limitations on the New Rules
An initial substantive challenge the new regime faced came from landlords’
efforts to waive its key terms through leases. Competition for lease terms is rare
even in otherwise competitive rental housing markets;119 this should allow many
landlords to impose such terms. Tenants in the worst housing, who may be the
least sophisticated and have fewer alternatives, may be the most susceptible to
demands that they sign such leases. Many states recognized that implying a warranty of habitability into leases but making it waivable would accomplish little.120
Yet even unenforceable lease terms may compound tenants’ confusion about
their rights.121 Only a few jurisdictions sought affirmatively to deter landlords
from including such terms.122
Even without these lease terms, however, the new regime of landlord-tenant
law departed from symmetry between landlord and tenant in two subtle but important respects.123 First, many jurisdictions impose substantive rules that effectively prevent tenants from challenging the landlord’s breach of the implied war119
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ranty of habitability without the kinds of deliberate preparations that make that
defense unavailable when a hard-pressed tenant misses a rental payment and
must defend an action for possession for non-payment of rent.124 Second, most
jurisdictions require tenants defending possessory actions on the basis of the warranty of habitability to deposit contract rent as it comes due with the court. This
effectively excuses the landlord’s breach of his or her covenant of repair unless
the tenant continues to perform her or his covenant to pay rent.
Although contract law has never been perfectly symmetrical – and certainly is
not so today – none of these rules have obvious roots in contract law. Instead,
they appear to be products of further social engineering or hesitation about imposing the warranty of habitability. On the other hand, they are not necessarily
offensive to the contractualist, or modernizing, vision of the new regime of
landlord-tenant law. After all, the warranty of habitability was implied into contracts reached between landlord and tenant that contained no such provision.
Each of these rules could be framed as additional implied warranties from the
tenant or as limitations on the landlord’s warranty that the law implies into
residential leases.
These rules’ impact on the tenants’ rights revolution’s instrumental goals,
however, is profound. Although other factors intervened to help reshape the low
end of the housing market and the lives of low-income renters, these rules by
themselves likely would have sufficed to distort severely the impact of the
tenants’ rights revolution. This section describes these rules and considers how
they may rearrange the incentives analyzed in Part II above.
1. The Requirement that Rent Withholding Be Deliberate
Most states effectively require tenants invoking the implied warranty of habitability to demonstrate that their sole motive in failing to pay rent was to raise
repair issues.125 These rules commonly are described as requiring the tenant to
show ―good faith.‖ Some commentators suggest that tenants who have failed to
pay rent for some reason other than the landlord’s failure to repair should perhaps
be barred from raising the habitability defense as a ―legal afterthought.‖126 Some
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do this explicitly, even requiring an affidavit that the tenant has taken five
specified preparatory steps.127 One state imposes monetary penalties on tenants
who withhold rent absent strict compliance with statutory conditions.128
The most common method of ascertaining that the tenant’s invocation of the
warranty was deliberate is to require the tenant to prove that she or he gave the
landlord notice of any defects alleged.129 The Restatement declares that the landlord must ―keep the leased property in a condition that meets the requirements of
governing health, safety, and housing codes‖130 but grants tenants remedies only
when the ―the landlord does not correct his failure within a reasonable time after
being requested to do so.‖131 These requirements migrated to the contractual side
of landlord-tenant law from its tort side, which focuses on the landlord’s negligent disregard of known defects.132 Some courts have required more formal
notice than many tenants are likely to provide133 or sanctioned tenants with valid
defenses who had not given their landlords notice.134
2. Landlords’ Protective Orders
Probably the most important formal limitations on the new regime of landlord-tenant law are landlords’ protective orders (LPOs). LPOs are court orders or
statutory requirements that tenants deposit rent into court during the pendency of
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these actions as a condition to being heard on their defenses135 or receiving a jury
trial.136 For more affluent tenants with incomes sufficient to make these payments, LPOs may be mere nuisances. But for low-income tenants, the ones most
likely to live in slum housing, these orders may effectively keep the implied warranty out of court. This frustrates the instrumental, redistributive, and humanitarian goals of the new landlord-tenant regime. Moreover, because these orders find
little precedent in other areas of contract, they arguably preserve some of the
exceptionalism that the reforms sought to purge from landlord-tenant law.
a. The Genesis of LPOs
LPO requirements in many jurisdictions have extensive histories going back
long before the implied covenants of habitability and the prohibition on retaliatory eviction.137 Prior to the recognition of the implied warranty and the related
defense of retaliatory eviction, tenants had few defenses available in eviction
cases. Where ―the only issue is whether the allegations of the complaint are
true,‖138 an LPO had the effect only of requiring tenants to pay an undeniable obligation.139 Similarly, requiring rent payments on appeal after a trial has found
that rent owing merely echoes the court’s findings, providing the landlord security against loss during the period the appeal is pending.140 And although most
jurisdictions substantially rewrote their statutes on eviction procedure at the time
135

In [the] event [the tenant counterclaims for money under the rental agreement or the Act] the
court from time to time may order the tenant to pay into court all or part of the rent accrued and
thereafter accruing, and shall determine the amount due each party. The party to whom a net
amount is owed shall be paid first from the money paid into court, and the balance by the other
party.
URLTA § 4.105.
136
MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(2) (2009).
137
See, e.g., MICH. REV. STAT. ch. 123, § 8303 (1846).
138
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 63 (1972).
139
Even before the tenants’ rights revolution, tenants could argue constructive eviction or challenge
the landlord’s assertion about the rent level. Thus, even under the old regime, ―[o]f course, it is
possible for [LPOs] to be applied so as to deprive a tenant of a proper hearing in specific situations.‖ Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 65.
140
Cooks v. Fowler, 437 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1970)[hereinafter Cooks I]; Bell v. Tsintolas
Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1970); but see, Cooks v. Fowler, 459 F.2d 1269, 1272
(D.C. Cir. 1971)[hereinafter Cooks II]. A somewhat different situation is presented by bonds
imposed on appeal from courts that do not afford the parties full trials. Jurisdictions with these
procedures typically refer eviction actions to quasi-judicial magistrates for initial determinations.
Unsuccessful parties may then ―appeal‖ to a higher court, at which they receive a trial de novo.
MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-332(a), (d) (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-32 (2003). Some of the
parties’ basic procedural rights, in particular the right to a jury trial, may only be made available on
this ―appeal.‖ This caused one court to invalidate these ―appeal bonds,‖ Usher v. Waters, 438 F.
Supp. 1215 (W.D.N.C. 1977), leading the state to exempt indigent tenants from part of the
requirement. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-34(c1) (2003).
Access to appeal can be important to counter some of the problems described infra section II.B.
See Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 74-79 (invalidating on equal protection grounds an Oregon statute
requiring tenant-appellants to post bond for double rent to perfect an appeal); Fed. Nat’l Mortgage
Ass’n v. Wingate, 273 N.W.2d 456, 460-61 (Mich. 1979); Cooks I; Cooks II.
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they recognized reforms, having LPO requirements in their previous statutes
probably made these states more likely to continue to impose them without
careful consideration of their compatibility with the new regime.141
LPOs may be attempts to soothe landlords upset by the recognition of implied
covenants of habitability in residential leases, a pretrial rent collection mechanism as a quid pro quo.142 This would be especially true of courts that were recognizing the covenants without statutory support143 and therefore subject to landlords’ criticism for exceeding their institutional roles.144 Some courts seemed to
feel that LPOs were compelled to protect landlords’ due process rights.145 They
have been particularly inclined to point to a perceived change in the ―once-summary‖ nature of eviction proceedings,146 and suggested that landlords deserved
compensation for delays147 in the form of assured collection of any rent owed.148
The courts establishing LPOs appear to have little understanding of how they
might impact low-income tenants. While they devote pages of meticulous legal
reasoning to support their recognition of the implied covenants,149 they impose

141

Commentators have been of little help. One of the more thorough critiques of URLTA mentions
LPOs only in passing. Richard E. Blumberg & Brian Quinn Robbins, Beyond URLTA: A Program
for Achieving Real Tenant Goals, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 9-10, n.39 (1976). Another major
article on the tenants’ rights reforms offers an essentially noncommittal summary of the thenexisting law on LPOs. Myron Moskovitz, The Implied Warranty of Habitability: A New Doctrine
Raising New Issues, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1444, 1473-80, 1482-87 (1974). The one discussion
specifically treating the escrow requirement in landlord-tenant litigation focuses on appeal bonds
rather than LPOs. Comment, Landlord Protective Orders — A Lack of Guidelines for Appellate
Use, 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 132 (1971).
142
Smith v. Wright, 416 N.E.2d 655, 662 (Ohio App. 1979).
143
E.g., King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973); Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp.,
428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Hinson v. Delis, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); Pugh v.
Holmes, 405 A.2d 897 (Pa. 1979); see also Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474, 482 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (suggesting that LPOs may be required to correct for the side-effects of ―judicial
innovation‖).
144
See, e.g., Pugh, 405 A.2d at 903-05.
145
Martins Ferry Jaycee Hous. v. Pawlaczyk, 448 N.E.2d 512, 514 (Ohio App. 1982); Rush v.
Southern Property Management, Inc., 173 S.E.2d 744, 746 (Ga. App. 1970).
146
Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474, 481-82 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
147
Id. at 484; KNG Corp. v. Kim, 110 P.3d 397 (Haw. 2005); Stranger v. Ridgway, 404 A.2d 56
(N.J. Dist. Ct. 1979); but see Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 371-76 (1974)(finding
ancient roots for the right to trial by jury in landlord-tenant cases). The delay argument assumes
that tenants are primarily responsible for delays in the proceedings, and hence subject to deterrence,
that LPOs provide effective deterrence, that shifting the costs of delay through LPOs will not
induce landlords to stall, and that the costs of the averted delays outweigh the burdens LPOs
impose. See Cunningham v. Phoenix Management, Inc., 540 A.2d 1099 (D.C. 1988) (upholding
dismissal of tenant’s pleadings and payment of escrow to landlord without trial when tenant missed
a payment after a year of receiving no relief on her complaints of code violations).
148
See Bell, 430 F.2d at 479 & n.10; Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168 (Cal. 1974); Dameron
v. Capitol House Associates Ltd. Partnership, 431 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1981).
149
See, e.g., King, 495 S.W.2d at 67-77; Javins, 428 F.2d at 1072-83; Hinson, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 66267; Pugh, 405 A.2d at 900-10.
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LPO requirements, often virtually without explanation, in a paragraph150 or a
footnote,151 generally as dictum.152 Some tenants’ advocates shared this lack of
empathy, themselves suggesting LPOs.153 Indeed, some cannot resist moralizing
at tenants invoking the new defenses, calling LPOs necessary to demonstrate
their ―good faith.‖154
Some rationales offered for LPOs expose fissures between the various purposes of the underlying reforms. For example, those focused on the instrumental
goal of housing improvement view LPOs as creating a ―pool‖ of money for repairs.155 Suggesting that rent excused under the implied warranty should repair
the landlord’s building certainly clashes with the redistributive goal, and lowincome tenants may face pressing humanitarian needs for which that money
could prove vital. And requiring the buyer to pay the purchase price to a breaching seller to correct the latter’s noncompliance is hardly standard in contract law.
At most, the ―repairs pool‖ argument might justify post-judgment escrowing of
that portion of the rent not abated under the implied warranty.156 Most striking in
its resistance to the new regime was the view that LPOs were needed to reduce
the number of tenants asserting the new habitability defense.157
b. Characteristics of LPOs
In general, LPOs are imposed on tenants when they raise defenses based upon
their new rights158 or when they demand jury trials.159 Some jurisdictions limit
LPOs to ―action[s] for possession based upon nonpayment of the rent‖ and
―action[s] for rent when the tenant is in possession‖,160 but others allow LPOs
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See, e.g., King, 495 S.W.2d at 77; Hinson, 428 F.2d at 666; Pugh, 405 A.2d at 907.
See Javins, 428 F.2d at 1083, n.67.
152
See, e.g., Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114 (W.Va. 1978); King, 495 S.W.2d at 77; Javins, 428
F.2d at 1083, n.67; Hinson, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 666. Indeed, the landlord in King did not respond to
the tenant’s appeal in the Missouri Court of Appeals.
153
Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 67 n.13; Javins at 1083, n.67; LePrade v. Liebler, 614 A.2d 546 (D.C.
1992); Jackson v. Rivera, 318 N.Y.S.2d 7 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1971); Spector, supra note 74, at 207.
154
Dameron; L.V.G. Realty Corp. by Oles v. Maltez, 561 N.Y.S.2d 630 (N.Y.City Ct. 1990); see
Emily Jane Goodman, Housing Court: The New York Tenant Experience, 17 URB. L. ANN. 57, 59
(1979).
155
Scroggins v. Solchaga, 552 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. App. 1996); see, e.g., Teller; King, 495 S.W.2d
at 79; City of Mount Vernon v. Brooks, 469 N.Y.S.2d 517 (N.Y. City Ct. 1983); 176 East 123rd
Street Corp. v. Flores, 317 N.Y.S.2d 150 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970); Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Velez, 343
N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973) ; cf., Pugh, 405 A.2d at 907 (exhibiting confusion as to which
party’s interests LPOs serve).
156
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.190(a) (Michie 2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 239, § 8A
(West 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 540:13-d(II) (1997).
157
Stranger v. Ridgway, 404 A.2d 56 (N.J. Dist. Ct. 1979).
158
See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(9)(a) (2009); HENNEPIN COUNTY (MINN.) MUN. CT. R. 10.06
(2008); Bell, 430 F.2d at 483; URLTA § 4.105(a).
159
See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(2); Bell, 430 F.2d at 483.
160
URLTA § 4.105(a); Bell, 430 F.2d at 483; Lindsey v. Prillman, 921 A.2d 782 (D.C. 2007).
151
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even when the landlord has not put rent at issue.161 Some jurisdictions also restrict LPOs to delays clearly caused by tenants.162
Although many jurisdictions require LPOs in all cases163 or allow them on the
judge’s own motion,164 others require the landlord to take the initiative by filing a
motion and showing ―a clear need for protection‖ or something similar.165 LPOs
are equitable in nature166 so landlords theoretically should establish the usual prerequisites for obtaining equity, including irreparable harm, inadequacy of their
remedies at law, likely success on the merits167 and clean hands. This would require landlords to prove that they have complied with health and safety laws to
receive the ―extraordinary‖168 protection of an LPO, although little evidence suggests that this happens in practice.
LPOs may require tenants to pay all current rent as it accrues,169 or although
some may require less,170 such as the ―reasonable rent for the premises.‖171 They
may also require tenants to deposit all of the back rent in dispute172 or the undisputed portion of the back rent.173 LPOs generally require tenants to make payments into a registry at the court,174 but some compel tenants to pay landlords
161

MICH. CT. R. 4.201(J)(1); Cunningham v. Phoenix Management, Inc., 540 A.2d 1099 (D.C.
1988).
162
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-26b (West 1994 & Supp. 2004) allows LPOs when the tenant
delays filing his or her answer.
163
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.60(2) (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 61-30444-7-75 (1991); N.Y. MULT.
DWELL. LAW § 302-a (McKinney 2001); but see Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11, 2021 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971); HENNEPIN COUNTY (MINN.) MUN. CT. R. 10.06; King v. Morehead, 495
S.W.2d 65, 77 (Mo. App. 1973).
164
URLTA § 4.105(a).
165
Bell, 430 F.2d at 483; Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1978); McNeal v. Habib, 346
A.2d 508, 512 (D.C. 1975) (giving tenant right to be heard but no right to present evidence); MICH.
CT. R. 4.201(H)(2); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-26b (West 1994 & Supp. 2004).
166
Bell, 430 F.2d at 479.
167
Id. at 484.
168
Id. at 481.
169
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.60(2) (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 47-7-75 (a) (1991); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 521-78(a) (Michie 2000); Lipshutz v. Shantha, 240 S.E.2d 738 (Ga. App. 1977)
(refusing to reduce amount of LPO by amount tenants spent on repairs).
170
See, e.g., URLTA § 4.105(a).
171
Bell, 430 F.2d at 483; MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(1) (2009).
172
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-421(1) (2003)(allowing the court to require tenants to pay ―all or
part of the rent accrued‖ into court); GA. CODE ANN. § 47-7-75(a) (1991)(mandatory deposit of all
back rent ―allegedly owed‖ for which the tenant cannot show a receipt); URLTA § 4.105(a); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 83.60(2) (West 2004); Fritz v. Warthen, 213 N.W.2d 339, 343 (Minn. 1973); see
Swartwood v. Rouleau, 1999 WL 293898 (Minn. App. 1999) (requiring tender of all back rent
allegedly due).
173
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1365(A) (West 2000).
174
See, e.g., MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(2)(1)(A)(i); URLTA § 4.105(a); Bell, 430 F.2d at 479; HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 521-79 (Michie 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 47-7-75 (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
83.60(2) (West 2004); Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897, 907 (Pa. 1979); King v. Morehead, 495
S.W.2d 65, 77 (Mo. App. 1973).
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directly175 or the court to disburse the tenant’s payments to the landlord176 before
a trial on the merits or even after the tenant has prevailed.177 LPO requirements
may only come into effect if the action has not been tried after a certain waiting
period,178 and they may be limited to a certain duration.179
The failure of many jurisdictions to specify the penalty or response for tenants’ failure to make payments required under an LPO, and a procedure for imposing that penalty or response,180 suggests that many judges and legislators are
so far removed from the condition of low-income tenants that they cannot imagine noncompliance.181 Although LPOs’ delay-preventing rationale would make
an accelerated trial on the merits a logical response to nonpayment of escrow,182
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See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 118A.490(1) (Michie 2003); Dameron v. Capitol House
Associates Ltd. Partnership, 431 A.2d 580 (D.C. 1981); City of Mount Vernon v. Brooks, 469
N.Y.S.2d 517 (N.Y. City Ct. 1983).
176
Cunningham v. Phoenix Management, Inc., 540 A.2d 1099 (D.C. 1988); McNeal v. Habib, 346
A.2d 508, 512 (D.C. 1975); Juliano v. Strong, 448 A.2d 1379 (Pa.Super. 1982); see, e.g., URLTA §
4.105(a) (allowing the court to ―determine the amount due to each party‖ but not specifying that
this determination must be after a full trial on the merits); MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(2)(2) (requiring
court to ―consider the defendant’s defenses‖ but does not specify whether this consideration must
take the form of the trial); Fritz, 213 N.W.2d at 343; King, 495 S.W.2d at 77; cf., Washington v.
H.G. Smithy Co., 769 A.2d 134 (D.C. 2001) (allowing all collected rents to go to landlord if tenant
did not raise habitability early in proceedings); but see Hinson v. Delis, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666
(Cal. App.1972); Bell, 430 F.2d at 485; Leejon Realty Co. v. Davis, 416 N.Y.S.2d 948 (N.Y. Sup.
1977) (denying disbursement to landlord who had failed to repair).
177
Temple v. Thomas D. Walsh, Inc., 485 A.2d 192 (D.C. 1984).
178
See, e.g., Liam Hooksett, LLC v. Boynton, 956 A.2d 304 (N.H. 2008) (allowing LPOs only
when trial adjourned to allow for repairs); Edmond v. Waters, 374 A.2d 483 (N.J. Super 1977)
(finding LPO inappropriate where trial imminent); GA. CODE ANN. § 47-7-75 (1991) (LPO may be
entered only after one month from the date of the complaint); MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(2)(a),
4.201(J)(1)(LPOs may be entered only for delays of more than seven days); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
504B.341(a) (West 2002)(LPOs may be entered for adjournments of more than six days).
179
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504B.341(b) (West 2002) (limiting adjournments and LPOs to
three months); cf., ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.190(a) (Michie 2004) (six-month limit on tenants’ posttrial deposits where landlords have been found to have failed to maintain the premises); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 540:13-d(II) (1997) (one month limit on tenants’ post-trial deposits).
180
See, e.g., URLTA § 4.105(a); Bell 430 F.2d 474; King 495 S.W.2d 65.
181
But see Lovejoy v. Intervest Corp., 794 So. 2d 1205 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) (upholding ―the
principle that an excessive bond may not be used to deny a meritorious appeal to a person of
modest means‖).
182
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-26b (West 1994 & Supp. 2004); see also Rome v. Walker, 196
N.W.2d 850, 854 (Mich. App. 1972).
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a number of jurisdictions refuse to allow tenants to raise their defenses,183 deny
tenants jury trials,184 or issue ―default judgments‖ for landlords.185
c. LPOs’ Effect
Data on the issuance of, and compliance with LPOs, is largely lacking. 186 As
discussed in the next section, however, very, very few low-income tenants appear
to receive relief based on the implied warranty of habitability and related doctrines; because they sharply reduce the expected value of pursuing those defenses, LPOs likely are a significant part of the reason. And when Detroit’s
Landlord-Tenant Court made the right to a trial by jury conditional on compliance with LPOs, a year-long study found not one of the more than 20,000 tenants
appearing unrepresented received a jury trial.187
Beyond this sparse data, both the burden of LPO payments and the risk of suffering the penalties for non-compliance are considerably greater for the poorest
tenants and for those with the most serious repair problems. Conversely, LPOs
provide the greatest benefit to the least responsible landlords: those that fail to
maintain their units – and thus that would be most likely to lose in a trial on the
merits – and those willing to act ruthlessly to drive an assertive tenant from her
or his dwelling. LPOs therefore directly undermine the repair-forcing, redistributive, and humanitarian goals of the tenants’ right revolution.
LPOs’ impact varies dramatically depending upon the wealth of the tenant.
For well-to-do tenants, complying with an LPO may be a bother and an expense.
For the lowest-income tenants, however, making escrow payments may some183

See, e.g., Swartwood v. Rouleau, 1999 WL 293898 (Minn. App. 1999) (affirming refusal to
allow tenant to offer defenses without tendering all back rent allegedly due); Conway v. Nissley,
1995 WL 723298 (Ohio App. 1995) (affirming dismissal of counterclaims of tenant in arrearage on
rent); Smith v. Wright, 416 N.E.2d 655, 657 (Ohio App. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.60(2) (West
2004); Jaroush v. Cook, 296 S.E.2d 544 (W.Va. 1982) (requiring consideration of defenses of
tenant missing LPO payments).
184
See, e.g., Harris v. Housing Authority of Baltimore City, 549 A.2d 770 (Md. App. 1988)
(requiring a hearing for tenant missing LPO payments); MICH. CT. R. 4.201(H)(2)(a)(iii)(I) (2009).
This might also be the response of jurisdictions that impose LPOs in response to tenants’ jury
demands. See Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
185
See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 521-78(b) (Michie 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 47-7-75(c)
(1991); Davis v. Rental Associates, Inc., 456 A.2d 820 (D.C. 1983) (approving default judgment
despite tenant’s tender of full amount of arrearage prior to trial); Mahdi v. Poretsky Management,
Inc., 433 A.2d 1085 (D.C. 1981) (approving of judgment for landlord as sanction for tenant’s nonpayment of LPO); but see Rotheimer v. Arana, 892 N.E.2d 1183 (Ill. App. 2008) (rejecting
judgments of possession as sanctions for nonpayment of LPOs); K.D. Lewis Enterprises Corp., Inc.
v. Smith, 445 So.2d 1032, 1035 (Fla.App. 5 Dist.,1984) (granting landlord possession but allowing
tenant to litigate counterclaims).
186
See RICHARD T. LEGATES & ALAN GREENWOOD, AN ANALYSIS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL
COSTS OF PRE-TRIAL RENT DEPOSITS IN CALIFORNIA (1992)(estimating large administrative costs to
expand LPOs).
187
Marilyn Miller Mosier & Richard A. Soble, Modern Legislation, Metropolitan Court, Minuscule
Results: A Study of Detroit’s Landlord-Tenant Court, 7 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 8, 47, 25, 36 (1973).
In 20,228 cases, the tenant had no attorney.
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times be impossible and may often require foregoing other necessities.188 Where
the tenant actually owes the demanded funds but faces a horrific dilemma, she or
he may only seek relief under equity courts’ traditional mandate of mercy for the
poor.189 But if the landlord has failed to maintain the premises, the implied
warranty of habitability vitiates some or all of the tenant’s rental obligation, and
she or he should not be faulted for diverting those funds to meeting other needs.
In addition, public assistance programs pay some tenants’ rent directly to the
landlord; the tenant may be unable to redirect those payments to the court in time
to prevent a default on the LPO.190
Unethical landlords may induce tenants to default on escrow payments.
Landlords are more likely to be repeat players with greater familiarity with court
procedures;191 they may be able to mislead or confuse their tenants about the
latter’s escrow obligations. In a jurisdiction providing for an automatic forfeiture
of the tenant’s rights upon a default in escrow payments, the landlord may be
able to induce a default with a hint of forbearance. Where the escrow order was
oral or written in ―legalese,‖ pro se tenants may default after relying upon
inaccurate information from the landlord. The landlord may persuade the court
to issue an escrow order for more than the contract rent amount.192 Similarly,
landlords jurisdictions requiring payment of back rent in dispute may demand
money they already received. Poor tenants are particularly susceptible to these
tactics, both because they cannot afford to make double payments and because
their market position prevents them from insisting upon more formal accounting
procedures.
LPOs’ burden may be compounded if the low-income tenants’ dwelling has
severe defects, i.e., if the tenant has strong defenses under the implied warranty
of habitability. The tenant may have to spend his or her rent money to mitigate
the damages a defect in the premises has caused.193 For example, a tenant
without adequate heat may spend the rent money on space heaters. Malicious
188

Harris v. Housing Authority of Baltimore City, 549 A.2d 770 (Md. App. 1988) (rejecting
hardship defense of unemployed tenant); See CHILDREN’S SENTINEL NUTRITION ASSESSMENT
PROGRAM (C-SNAP), FUEL FOR OUR FUTURE: IMPACTS OF ENERGY INSECURITY ON CHILDREN’S
HEALTH, NUTRITION, AND LEARNING 3 (2007), available at http://www.childrenshealthwatch.org/
upload/resource/fuel_for_our_future_9_18_07.pdf (describing hardships low-income families face
when they have insufficient funds for both food and shelter costs).
189
J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 88-89, 104 (2d ed. 1979).
190
Cf. Shipman v. Carr, 449 A.2d 187 (Conn. Super. 1982) (rejecting habitability defense where
Section 8 payments on behalf of tenant terminated due to landlord’s failure to repair). A
sophisticated tenant could explain this to the court; many low-income tenants, however, may not
know when or how to explain this or may be embarrassed by their public assistance status.
191
A. Pollock & G. Korus, The Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code: Proposed Procedural
Reforms, 26 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317, 321-22 (1972).
192
Lovejoy v. Intervest Corp., 794 So. 2d 1205 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001); Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown,
318 N.Y.S. 2d 11, 20-21 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971).
193
See Lipshutz v. Shantha, 240 S.E.2d 738 (Ga. App. 1977) (refusing to reduce amount of LPO by
amount tenants spent on repairs).
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landlords can force tenants to divert their rent money by cutting off essential
utilities or creating some other intolerable condition once an LPO issues.
Well-intentioned tenants with strong defenses may fail to make required
escrow payments because they doubt the courts will grant them redress. A tenant
whose dwelling has deteriorated to the point that it is worth far less than the
payment the LPO requires may see compliance as throwing good money after
bad. Moving may seem a more reasonable alternative, at least avoiding payment
of back rent to the non-repairing landlord. By encouraging tenants to move
rather than to pursue claims against non-repairing landlords, LPOs frustrate the
instrumental, redistributive, and humanitarian purposes of the tenants’ rights
reforms (although they may be prompting efficient breaches).
B. Empirical Evidence of the New Regime’s Impact in Court
A wide variety of courts, using a wide variety of procedures, handle eviction
cases. Studies of the new landlord-tenant regime’s implementation further vary
in methodology and in quality. Their conclusions, however, are strikingly consistent.
First, the new substantive regime did not appear to increase number of eviction cases filed.194 This suggests that few tenants are withholding rent deliberately to bring the issue of repairs to court.
Second, the judicial resources the average case receives are quite modest.195
Nine-minute trials196 take the concept of a ―rocket docket‖ to an entirely different
level. The number of jury trials has remained extremely small.197
Third, a huge fraction of eviction cases never reach open court.198 Landlordtenant courts have extremely high default rates.199 Courts depend on default
194

Mosier and Soble, supra note 204, at 22, report that the number of possession actions filed in
Detroit’s Landlord-Tenant Court remained almost the same in 1969, the first full year in which the
reforms were in force. The number rose somewhat the next year, but then began moving back
towards its pre-tenants’ rights level.
195
In 1985, each New York City Housing Court judge handled 8,688 evictions. Ken Karas,
Recognizing the Right to Counsel for Indigent Tenants in Eviction Proceedings in New York, 24
J.L. & SOC. PROB. 527, 537 n.86 (1991). Detroit Landlord-Tenant Court judges annually disposed
of more than 10,000 cases each in the 1970s. Mosier & Soble, at 21.
196
Rose and Scott, supra note 59, at 1001-03, found the average contested case nine minutes.
Anthony Fusco, Jr., et al., Chicago’s Eviction Court: A Tenants’ Court of No Resort, 17 URB. L.
ANN. 93, 105 (1979), report that in Chicago ―[t]he average court-allotted time for each contested
case was approximately two minutes,‖ including the approximately 20 seconds ―necessary to call
the case and for the parties to approach the bench.‖
197
Mosier and Soble, at 49, report that only nine jury trials were held in Detroit’s Landlord-Tenant
Court in twelve months of 1970 and 1971. Over a fifteen-year period, less than five-one-hundredths of a percent of Ohio evictions were tried to a jury. Frank G. Avellone, The Maddening
Status of the “Habitability Defense” in Ohio Eviction Law: Revisiting Where We Must, 23 URB.
LAW. 355, 359 n.31 (1991).
198
Some 96% of Maryland eviction cases are uncontested, making the appearance of crowded
dockets illusory. Williams v. Housing Authority of Baltimore City, 760 A.2d 697 (Md. 2000).
199
Some 53% of the eviction actions filed in Springfield, Massachusetts, in 1978 resulted in defaults
being entered. Jerrold B. Winer, Pro Se Aspects of Hampden County Housing Court: Helping
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judgments to control their dockets and design procedures to obtain them
whenever possible,200 typically requiring no motion or affidavit – which pro se
landlords might not know how to produce – before entering a default judgment.201 In addition, court personnel and landlords’ lawyers induce most tenants
to concede in formal or informal settlements.202 Once the landlords receive all
that they sought – either rent or possession – they voluntarily dismiss their
cases.203 This suggests that many tenants are indeed choosing to move rather
than litigate. A number of judges encourage those tenants reaching court to make
the same choice.204
Fourth, of the minority of cases reaching court, the overwhelming majority
are resolved with no reference to the condition of the premises.205 Some tenants
may have their defenses foreclosed by failure to give the landlord notice or to pay
escrow under an LPO. For a great many, however, this is the result of a overwhelming mismatch in knowledge and litigating capacity. Many tenants lack the
sophistication to assert the warranty in a written pleading206 or the presence of
mind and assertiveness to do so orally in the momentary window of opportunity
presented in open court.207 Because of very limited legal services funding,208 tenPeople Help Themselves, 17 URB. L. ANN. 71, 79 (1979). Mosier and Soble, at 26, reported that in
1970-71, 59.2 percent of the nonpayment actions and 51.4 percent of other eviction actions resulted
in default judgments against the tenant. Rose & Scott, at 994, recorded a default rate of 49.4
percent in nonpayment actions and 45.2 percent other eviction cases. About eighty percent of
Washington, D.C., tenants default. Cunningham, supra note 84, at 107, 134.
200
Rose & Scott, at 988 n.88.
201
Cunningham, at 111; compare FED. R. CIV. PROC. 55(b) (2010)(requiring an affidavit or motion).
202
Cunningham, at 117; 144 Woodruff Corp. v. Lacrete, 585 N.Y.S.2d 956 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct.
1992) (describing tenants’ propensity to sign settlements out of fear even where they have
meritorious defenses).
203
Mosier and Soble, at 26, found 23.5 percent of nonpayment defendants, and 17.0 percent of other
eviction defendants, capitulated before their cases reached court. Rose and Scott, at 994, similarly
found 24.6 percent of nonpayment defendants and 11.2 percent of other tenant-defendants gave up
before their court dates.
204
Judges repeatedly interrupted tenants’ testimony about defects in the premises with coercive
suggestions that the tenants move: ―If it’s so bad, why don’t you move?‖, ―Of course you want to
move,‖ ―Maybe he’s doing you a favor,‖ etc. Rose & Scott, at 1009-10; Fusco et al., at 105 n.61;
Garrett v. Cross, 935 So.2d 845 (La. App. 2006) (affirming trial judge who responded to tenant’s
complaints about repairs by telling tenant that was ――one reason, probably, why you want to move
out‖).
205
See Berman & Sons, Inc. v. Jefferson, 396 N.E.2d 981 (Mass 1979) (noting that tenants raise the
new defenses in only a tiny fraction of cases, making the cost for landlords slight).
206
E.g., Vanlandingham v. Ivanow, 615 N.E.2d 1361 (Ill. App. 1993); Sandefur Mgmt. Co. v.
Smith, 486 N.E.2d 1234 (Ohio App. 1985); . A clerk reported ―it is almost impossible to educate
tenants that an answer should be filed prior to the hearing.‖ Perhaps because of ―an inability to
express one’s feelings in writing, … the vast majority of tenants simply appear in court to give their
side of the story without any prior notice.‖ Winer, at 78.
207
Bezdek, supra note 61, at 566-97.
208
Karas, supra note 195, at 535-36; Lynn Cunningham, The Legal Needs of the Low-Income
Population of Washington, 5 U.D.C. L. REV. 21 (2000).
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ants are seldom represented by counsel,209 and without the help of lawyers have
not understood their new rights or court procedures well.210 Landlords, on the
other hand, are far more likely to be represented211 and frequently leverage their
superior legal knowledge to confuse and mislead unrepresented tenants.212 Even
when landlords are not represented, courts typically require even less specificity
than the usual level of notice pleading.213 Legal stationery stores or even courts
provide landlords with form complaints that prompt them for all allegations required to make out their cases,214 with no comparable resource typically available
to pro se tenants unsure about their defenses.215 Judges and clerks commonly assist landlords in making their cases and refuting their tenants.216 Thus landlords,
in sharp contrast to tenants, actually fare better in court unrepresented.217
The adjudicatory model that emerges is a curious hybrid of the common law
adversarial system and an almost administrative inquisitorial system. Landlords
– these courts’ traditional constituents – benefit from a particularly lenient ver209

Brakel, supra note 57, at 581, reports that Legal Aid attorneys represent only nine percent of
tenants in contested eviction cases. Mosier & Soble, at 36, report tenants being represented in
Detroit Landlord-Tenant Court in only 7.0 of contested cases. Fusco et al., supra note Error!
Bookmark not defined., at 105 n.63, report that only 7.1 percent of the tenants appearing in
contested cases were represented. With only one in five cases contested, Mosier & Soble, at 29,
this means that only one to two percent of tenant facing eviction have counsel. Only twelve percent
of New York City tenants in contested cases had lawyers in the 1990s. Carroll Seron, et al., The
Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in New York City's Housing Court: Results
of a Randomized Experiment, 35 L. & SOC’Y REV. 419, 421 (2001).
210
When Detroit’s Landlord-Tenant Court briefly replaced traditional legalese notices and
summonses with ―plain English‖ forms briefly mentioning the defenses of retaliation and failure to
repair, tenants raised defenses at up to twice the prior rate. Rose & Scott, at 997-99.
211
Mosier and Soble, at 36, report that landlords were represented in 48.6% of the ―contested
cases.‖ Fusco et al., at 105 n.62, found 73.8 percent of Chicago landlords represented. Ninetyeight percent of New York City landlords had counsel. Seron, et al., at 421.
212
The Center for National Housing Law Reform’s 1978 study of landlord-tenant cases in eleven
Michigan cities found that in 90 percent of the cases resolved out-of-court, tenants received terms
as bad as or worse than the harshest judgments the court could have issued. (Copy on file with
author.)
213
Cunningham, supra note 84, at 127-29.
214
Id. at 119.
215
A court committee in Detroit designed, but did not widely distribute, a form answer. Rose &
Scott, at 986-91, 1024. The Connecticut Housing Court made similar efforts to be open to pro se
litigants. Eldergill, supra note 125, at 299-300.
216
Fusco, et al., at 108-25; see Espinoza v. Calva, 87 Cal.Rptr.3d 492 (Cal. App. 2008) (reversing
trial court for so limiting tenants’ time to present evidence as to ―in effect, preclude[] them from
presenting their defense‖); R & O Management Corp. v. Ahmad, 819 N.Y.S.2d 382 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2006) (reversing dismissal of tenant’s counterclaims, which the landlord-tenant court had
entered because the landlord was unprepared); Koch v. Mac Queen, 746 N.Y.S.2d 229 (N.Y. Sup.
App. Term 2002) (reversing trial judge that rejected habitability defense after refusing to subpoena
building inspector and refusing to admit photographs of the premises); Prince Hall Village
Apartments v. Braddy, 538 P.2d 603 (Okla. Civ. App. 1975) (finding bias in trial judge’s
questioning tenant about receipt of welfare).
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Mosier & Soble, at 35-37 (citing results from Detroit and Brooklyn); Rose & Scott, at 1001-02.
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sion of notice pleading, approaching an inquisitorial approach. Tenants, on the
other hand, must articulate an explicit legal defense in a way more reminiscent of
old common law pleading218 – or even the old English practice of ―waging one’s
law.‖
Fifth, landlords won an overwhelming proportion of the nonpayment actions
filed. Even where rental housing conditions were bad219 and getting worse,220
landlords were winning total victories in upwards of 97 percent of all
nonpayment cases started.221 And with lack of counsel, and lack of sophistication
among pro se tenants contributing significantly to these results – and with the
poorest tenants typically living in the worst housing – the largest disparity
between objective housing conditions and results in court is likely among those
whom the reforms most sought to aid.
218

See Payne v. Rivera, 2010 N.Y. Slip Op. 20182 (N.Y. City. Civ. 2010) (severing tenant’s
counterclaim for failure to repair); Garrett v. Cross, 935 So.2d 845 (La. App. 2006) (finding
tenant’s complaint about landlord’s failure to repair insufficient to assert habitability defense);
Jablonski v. Casey, 835 N.E.2d 615 (Mass. App. 2005) (affirming dismissal of habitability defense
despite housing code violations including leaks, cracked walls and floors, and ant infestation for
tenant’s failure to show clear harm); 601 West Realty LLC. v. Chapa, 2003 WL 22087614 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 2003) (dismissing tenant’s counterclaim because tenant ―failed to establish the impact of‖
lead paint and other housing code violations); Cater v. Saunders, 2002 WL 31207219 (N.Y. Dist.
Ct. 2002) (same); Flynn v. Riemer, 1991 Mass. App. Div. 50 (1991) (finding no breach of warranty
when tenant was without water for four weeks but did not prove that landlord acted willfully); L &
M Inv. Co. v. Morrison, 605 P.2d 1347 (Or. App. 1980) (finding housing code violations
insufficient to establish lack of habitability); Brown v. Robyn Realty Co., 367 A.2d 183 (Del.
Super. 1976) (dismissing tenant’s habitability argument for failure to plead terms of lease
properly); cf., Dickhut v. Norton, 173 N.W.2d 297 (Wis. 1970) (imposing strict requirements on
tenants alleging retaliatory eviction).
219
At the same time Cleveland’s landlord-tenant court was rarely invoking the warranty, 64,000 of
the 133,000 rental units in Cleveland were ―substandard.‖ David McIntyre, URLTA in Operation:
The Ohio Experience, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 587, 594. The estimated rat population of the
City of Detroit in 1974 was 750,000. DETROIT NEWS, July 1, 1974, at 2B.
220
The Detroit Department of Health reported in 1972 there were 5,185 fewer well-maintained
residential structures in the city that year than there were in 1968, the year Michigan’s legislature
passed the tenants’ rights reforms. Mosier & Soble, at 64, n. 92. Approximately 30 percent of
Detroit’s housing was ―deteriorating‖ or ―dilapidated‖ in 1972. Id.
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Gerchick, supra note 98, at 790. Mosier and Soble report that Detroit tenants in 1970-71 won
total victories in only one-tenth of one percent of the cases started. Mosier & Soble, 33-34.
Tenants won partial rent abatements in another two percent of the cases. Rose & Scott, supra note
204, at 1009, report that landlords were winning favorable outcomes in 97.5 percent of the
nonpayment cases started in 1974. Fusco et al., , at 104, report that Chicago landlords in 1976 won
everything they sought in at least 84.6% of the ―contested cases‖ heard. This figure is virtually
identical to the ―contested case‖ statistics reported by Mosier and Soble. Mosier & Soble, at 33.
(A ―contested case‖ is one in which both the landlord and the tenant appear. Mosier and Soble
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reforms. See Mclntyre, at 596.
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Sixth, even in those rare cases where courts did award tenants relief for
defective housing, the amounts of those awards were far too small to give
landlords incentives to repair or to encourage other tenants to raise defenses.222
Seventh, although objective data is unavailable on the number of tenants with
valid retaliation defenses, judgment for a tenant on this basis is extremely rare. 223
A landlord contemplating a retaliatory eviction would be unlikely to be deterred
by a prohibition so seldom enforced.224 Although no empirical evidence allows
comparison of the number of landlords resorting to self-help before and after the
reforms, their success rate in court gives them little reason to resort to self-help.
Beyond these statistics is a consistent picture of courts ill-equipped or disinclined to carry out the transformative role the tenants’ rights revolution envisioned for them.225 One state high court lamented:
The atmosphere of the Detroit Landlord-Tenant Court . . . does not encourage deliberate, reasoned and compassionate justice, although it deals with one
of the basic material essentials of life, a roof over one’s head. Judges, litigants and court personnel are harassed and depressed. In many cases both the
landlords and tenants are barely making it financially, and oftentimes they are
222

See, e.g., 303 Beverly Group, L.L.C. v. Alster, 735 N.Y.S.2d 908 (N.Y. Sup. 2001) (disallowing
consequential damages); Surratt v. Newton, 393 S.E.2d 554 (N.C. App. 1990) (disallowing
damages exceeding the amount of rent paid); Landmarks Restoration Corp. v. Gwardyak, 485
N.Y.S.2d 917 (N.Y. City 1985) (abating rent 20% but offsetting that with an exceptional award of
attorneys’ fees to the landlord); Tower West Associates v. Derevnuk, 450 N.Y.S.2d 947
(N.Y.City.Civ. 1982) (granting 10% rent abatement); C. F. Seabrook Co. v. Beck, 417 A.2d 89
(N.J. Super. App. 1980) (denying rent abatements for months other than those for which landlord’s
action sought rent); but see Brown v. LeClair, 482 N.E.2d 870 (Mass. App. 1985) (affirming award
of statutory damages for willful failure to repair); Pleasant East Associates v. Cabrera, 480
N.Y.S.2d 693 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct.1984) (awarding punitive damages where failure to repair racially
motivated).
223
According to Mosier & Soble, at 34-35, Detroit tenants in 1970-71 won only 0.4 percent of all
simple termination cases started. Some of these cases may have involved other defenses, such as
an assertion that the notice to terminate tenancy was improper in form or service. So the actual
number of cases in which tenants prevailed on the retaliation defense could be even smaller. (The
Chicago figures reported supra were for all ―contested cases,‖ including both nonpayment and
other termination actions.)
224
Moreover, because the only penalty for attempted retaliation is refusal to allow that eviction,
even strict enforcement of the prohibition would have little deterrent value. See Building
Monitoring Systems, Inc. v. Paxton, 905 P.2d 1215 (Utah 1995) (allowing retaliatory evictions
once premises repaired and tenant given time to find other housing).
225
Fusco et al., at 108-25. Judges ruled against tenants even when the tenants’ was the only competent testimony on an issue, even when they supported a defense of payment with receipts, and even
when they proved the existence of serious repair problems with unrebutted photographic evidence.
Judges relied upon the incompetent hearsay of landlords’ lawyers who admitted having had no
direct contact with the premises. Judges asked landlords’ lawyers to check tenants’ allegations
with their clients by telephone and then entered judgment against the tenants on the basis of the
landlords’ uncross-examined ―telephone testimony.‖ ―[D]ead attorneys and landlords have secured
favorable judgment when represented by persons unauthorized to practice law.‖ Id. at 118. Rose
& Scott, at 1009-12, describe similar practices in Detroit’s Landlord-Tenant Court.
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not making it at all. Cases involve housing conditions that are not the most
desirable. Consequently, relations are often strained and not infrequently beyond the breaking point. Many of the tenants do not understand their rights at
all, although some understand them too well. Sometimes landlords are in the
same posture. It would be difficult to handle these cases with justice under
the best of circumstances. But circumstances are far from the best. The case
load is incredible. The court facilities are just a little better than tolerable.
Matters that can be avoided are avoided.226
As noted above, tenants’ propensity to raise the landlord’s failure to repair,
and hence the implied warranty’s deterrent effect, depend heavily on tenants’
prospects of success in court, both initially and against any subsequent retaliation. This is particularly true for tenants contemplating deliberate rent withholding. With substantive rules barring involuntary defendants and the courts’ tepid
implementation deterring more financially stable tenants, the implied warranty’s
effect is limited to small groups of outliers. The next Part asks whether means
were available to do better.
IV. WERE THE NEW REGIME’S FAILURES INEVITABLE?
The result of the supposed tenants’ rights revolution, then, falls far short of
achieving any of its three instrumental goals. As discussed above, the covenants
of landlord and tenant are not truly mutual if tenant’s breach renders landlord’s
irrelevant but the converse is not true. And landlord-tenant law remains an idiosyncratic world unto itself if landlords can obtain an effectively equitable remedy
without showing pre-requisites for equitable relief, including clean hands and the
lack of an adequate remedy at law – and without themselves being subject to
equitable orders compelling their compliance with the covenant of repair during
the pendency of the action.
The state of rental housing may have changed during this period,227 but the
implied warranty appears to have affected far too few cases to be a likely
cause.228 For the same reason, it seems unlikely that the implied warranty has
done much to improve the quality of life of the low-income tenants whose plight
it claimed to address.
Although the substantive and procedural obstacles to the implied warranty’s
implementation are superficially separate, they are linked. The doctrines limiting
who can raise the implied warranty are a form of rationing judicial resources that
had not increased with the new need to find facts concerning housing conditions.
226

Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n v. Wingate, 273 N.W.2d 456, 460-61 (Mich. 1979).
See Part IV.C, infra.
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The overwhelming empirical evidence of the warranty’s non-enforcement in court would seem to
require econometricians claiming to find evidence of its effects, e.g., Werner Z. Hirsch, From
“Food For Thought” to “Empirical Evidence” About Consequences of Landlord-Tenant Laws, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 604, 609 (1984); Werner Z. Hirsch, Habitability Laws and the Welfare of
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The number of tenants deliberately invoking the warranty is small enough that
the courts could adjudicate their cases more or less within existing resource constraints.
This Part analyzes the tenants’ rights revolution’s failure on several levels.
Section A shows that the explicit legal rules that have prevented widespread invocation of the implied warranty were not inevitable corollaries of the new
tenants’ rights. Section B considers whether the tenants’ rights revolution might
have benefited from an infusion of procedural ideas from the contemporary welfare rights revolution. Section C explores broader changes in the housing market
to which the tenants’ right revolution has failed to respond. Finally, section D
sums up the new regime’s impact, highlighting the similarity between its failings
and those of the welfare rights revolution identified in the introduction.
A. Criticizing Formal Rules
Analyzing the impact of policies that have curtailed the implied warranty of
habitability is difficult for two reasons. Some, such as the complexity of trial
courts’ operating procedures and attitudes of trial judges and clerks, are difficult
to document and may genuinely not result from any organized, conscious decision-making. Others, including notice requirements and LPOs, are obvious and
deliberate but have impacts that are hard to trace in the empirical literature. All
of these barriers operate as a system, even if they may not be intended as such.
1. The Requirement of Deliberate Rent Withholding
The doctrines confining the implied warranty’s availability to tenants deliberately provoking nonpayment actions, and excluding those raising the warranty
only defensively, in part represent a moral judgment. The precise basis of that
judgment is unclear: surely a struggling business that fell behind on its payments
to a vendor could argue that the vendor’s goods were defective without opprobrium. Middle-class judges and lawyers, however, pay for their purchases on time
as a matter of pride, and by failing to do so without a deliberate, legally sanctioned plan, low-income tenants place themselves outside of the middle-class
value system. Courts and even their own lawyers describe the requirement that
tenants have the funds to pay the contract rent as demonstrating ―good faith.‖
Yet lacking funds is no indication of dishonesty.229 It does, of course, mean that
the tenant may be incapable of present performance. That should not necessarily
excuse the landlord’s performance.
Ordinarily, ―[i]t is customary to pay rent in advance‖230 for each month. The
landlord must perform his or her covenants during the upcoming month to earn
the prepaid rent. If the premises fall into disrepair during the ensuing month, the
landlord has not earned the rent already paid and is in breach.231 The standard
229

―Poverty and immorality are not synonymous.‖ Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177
(1941).
230
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 65 (1972).
231
When rent is prepaid and the tenant stops paying rent after the premises have fallen into
disrepair, the landlord will have failed to render performance for which the tenant has already paid.
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rule in contract is that a non-breaching party need not continue to perform once
the other has committed a material breach,232 one that gives the tenant ―substantially less or different‖ from what the warranty of habitability requires.233 Not all
breaches of the covenant to repair are material, but many are. Thus, if the landlord’s implied covenant to repair is truly mutual with the tenant’s express covenant to pay rent, the tenant’s obligation to pay rent ceased when material defects
appeared in the premises.234 Once the landlord materially breaches the implied
warranty of habitability, the tenant’s ability or inclination to pay rent would become irrelevant because that ―performance is excused‖235 until the landlord came
into compliance, at which point damages for the landlord’s breach would be ascertained.
Alternatively, if the landlord’s failure to repair is not material and the tenant
has stopped paying rent, the contract law would treat both parties as being in
breach and award appropriate damages against each.236 Where the tenant’s duty
to pay rent depends on the landlord’s performing the covenant to repair and the
landlord fails to do so, the landlord is entitled to damages, not the contract rent.237
Under this view, both landlord and tenant must answer for their respective
breaches where the tenant has stopped paying rent on a defective dwelling. Requiring the tenant to perform, or demonstrate capacity to perform her or his
covenant in order for the landlord to be liable for his or her breaches, is inconsistent with true mutuality of obligations.
Similarly, whether the tenant knows her or his legal rights at the time she or
he stops paying rent would be irrelevant under general contract law. Breach is
defined by the non-performing party’s conduct,238 not the contemporaneous state
of mind of the party alleging the breach.239
―Ordinarily, notice or demand is unnecessary where the obligation to perform
is absolute and unconditional.‖240 Exceptions apply when the obligated party has
no way to know when its performance is necessary or when the contract expliThe tenant’s tender of the next month’s rent is therefore not a condition to the landlord’s performance of his or her covenants for that month since the landlord has yet to earn all of the rent that
he or she has already received.
232
For example, ―[I]t is a condition of each party’s remaining duties to render performance to be
exchanged under an exchange of promises that there be no uncured material failure by the other
party to render any such performance due at an earlier time.‖ RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 237 (1981).
233
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234
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WILLISTON § 63.3 at 443.
236
ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 946 (one volume edition, 1952); WILLISTON
§ 63.3 at 428.
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WILLISTON § 63.2 at 427.
238
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235(2) (1981).
239
WILLISTON § 63.1 at 434.
240
17A AM. JUR. 2d CONTRACTS § 594 (2010).
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citly requires notice.241 Although some defects may be within the sole knowledge of tenants, many are not. Some are present when the tenant takes possession.242 Landlords can observe most others when they inspect their properties to
ensure that tenants are not causing damage. The U.C.C.’s rule requiring notice of
breach of warranty for defective goods243 provides a dubious analogy because
there the vendor has no continuing access to the goods; in any event, most courts
hold it inapplicable where the vendor is aware of the breach, as landlords often
will be.244
Of course, because the warranty of habitability is a term implied into the landlord-tenant contract by law, the courts could insert a notice requirement.245 Doing
so, however, would be unwise, particularly in light of the lower courts’ difficulty
in enforcing the new landlord-tenant regime. Giving notice exposes the tenant to
the risks of retaliation. Tenants currently unaware of the warranty of habitability
and of the legal protection against retaliatory eviction are exceedingly unlikely to
risk giving notice to a landlord they suspect does not wish to repair the premises
further. For the tenant that is familiar with her or his rights, the decision whether
to give notice is similar to, but not identical with, that discussed in the preceding
Part about whether to invoke the warranty of habitability affirmatively: the tenant
has no immediate prospect of monetary reward for taking action, but she also
does not face any immediate litigation costs and may hope that merely notifying
the landlord of a defect may not be as likely to provoke retaliation as withholding
rent or filing suit. As discussed above, however, making the implied warranty
available only to tenants making a deliberate decision to punish the landlord’s
failure to repair is likely to limit the effectiveness of that warranty considerably.
2. Landlords’ Protective Orders
The justifications offered for LPOs correspond closely to those for insisting
that rent withholding be deliberate. Even more directly than the requirements of
deliberate withholding, LPOs have become means of docket control, helping to
bridge the gap between the new regime’s generous substantive pronouncements
and its parsimonious allocation of adjudicatory resources. LPOs are likely to
cause some cases to settle and others to drop from dockets when tenants miss escrow payments due to financial emergencies or fatigue at living in the poorly-repaired dwelling. This docket-control orientation likely explains why rules limiting LPOs to unusual circumstances quickly gave way to near-universal issuance.
Because they so explicitly limit the mutuality of the covenants of landlord and
tenant and so directly subordinate the instrumental goals of the new substantive
regime, LPOs provide a useful basis for assessing whether the apparent
241
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revolution in landlord-tenant law represents a fundamental change or a modest,
nearly cosmetic, update.
Subsection a considers and dismisses the major rationales offered for LPOs.
Subsection b suggests that contemporary constitutional law provided courts several bases on which they could have declined to impose, or struck down, LPO
requirements.
a. Deficiencies in the Justifications Offered for LPOs
Arguments that LPOs are required to avoid depriving landlords of property
without due process of the law cannot bear serious scrutiny. First, the supposed
deprivation of property suffered by landlords during the course of the litigation of
possession disputes is no different from that suffered by any plaintiff with a
meritorious claim. Second, whether accruing rentals are in fact the landlord’s
property is unclear until trial of the tenant’s defenses. Third, even assuming the
landlord’s claim’s validity, routine litigation delays likely do not constitute a deprivation of due process.246 The Court seems unlikely to apply Mathews v. Eldridge247 or similar due process tests to constitutionalize the scheduling of civil
litigation, least of all in ―summary proceedings‖ already expedited more than
most civil cases.248 Indeed, landlords have no more right to compensation for the
new defenses’ elongation of possessory actions than tenants had when summary
proceedings replaced slow-moving common law ejectment.
LPOs, therefore, represent policy choices rather than constitutional obligations. The policy arguments for LPOs249 reflect the normative confusion underlying the tenants’ rights revolution. For example, several of the arguments for
LPOs reveal deep diffidence about the new regime’s enterprise of equalizing the
position of landlord and tenant. Arguments that LPOs protect landlords from
harm while the litigation is pending apply equally well to tenants living in defective housing, yet only the tenant’s covenant, and not the landlord’s, receives extraordinary pre-trial enforcement. Similarly, while LPOs protect landlords from
the possibility of unenforceable judgments,250 no comparable measure assures
tenants that landlords will make repairs a trial finds necessary or pay any judgments on the tenants’ counter-claims.
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Any rule allowing tenants to stay in their dwellings during the pendency of the litigation is ―in no
way responsible for‖ the tenants’ actions as it only ―permits but does not compel‖ those private
actions. Flagg Bros, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 165 (1978).
247
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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LPOs also preserve the exceptionalism of landlord-tenant law that the new regime sought to end: few other civil litigants must pay they moneys sought by
their adversaries in order to assert their defenses even when the amount in controversy is far higher than the value of most dwellings in summary proceedings
cases.251 One court found ―no evidence that it is any more difficult to satisfy a
judgment against a tenant than against any other debtor‖.252
Imposing LPOs to prevent delay in landlord-tenant proceedings is similarly
idiosyncratic. As the Court has noted,
Some delay … is inherent in any fair-minded system of justice. A landlordtenant dispute, like any other lawsuit, cannot be resolved . . . unless both
parties have had a fair opportunity to present their cases. Our courts were
never intended to serve as rubber stamps for landlords seeking to evict their
tenants, but rather to see that justice be done before a man is evicted from his
home.253
Although defendants in more complex cases can stall with abusive discovery,
eviction cases, with little or no discovery, provide no such opportunity. Treating
the raising of the new defenses as culpable delay betrays an ambivalence about
the new regime that courts and legislatures can address substantively if they are
so inclined. The main cause of delay in many courts is a deficient allocation of
resources to adjudicate eviction cases,254 reflecting a sense that they are less important than the rest of the courts’ dockets.255 Prompt scheduling is the obvious
remedy.256
Achieving the instrumental goal of improving urban housing conditions requires courts to be open to large numbers of cases, at least initially. Yet some
courts openly acknowledged using LPOs for docket control.257 These instrumental purposes also require tenants in ill-repaired dwellings to undertake the risk,
expense, and effort required to assert the implied warranty; requiring the tenant
to pay rent that the landlord has not earned as a ―pool‖ to finance repairs largely
eliminates that incentive – and also reduces landlords’ incentives to maintain
their units prior to litigation.
As with the roughly contemporaneous imposition of costly work requirements
that did little to enhance welfare recipients’ employability,258 the motivation for
LPOs appears largely moralistic. Granting welfare rights only to those recipients
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proving their moral worth through participation in workfare obviated the need to
confront stereotypes of the lazy poor;259 confining tenants’ rights to those tenants
proving their sincerity with deposits in court similarly insulated judges and legislators from attacks based on the stereotypes of the irresponsible, manipulative
poor. In each case, however, the failure to understand the challenges low-income
families confront led to numerous false negatives – industrious welfare recipients
unable to navigate workfare bureaucracies and honest tenants unable to comply
with LPOs – and prevented the underlying substantive reforms from reaching
more than a tiny fraction of their target populations. As the Court noted in Lindsey v Normet,260 monetary court access barriers not only bar meritorious arguments by those unable to make payments but also allow frivolous claims ―by
others who can afford‖ the required amounts. Little evidence suggests that tenants are more prone to raise meritless defenses than landlords are to make abusive claims261 or, indeed, than litigants in other kinds of cases are to abuse the
process.
b. Constitutional Questions about LPOs
In keeping with the sharp line the Court insisted it was drawing between
substance and process,262 Lindsey v. Normet263 declined to constitutionalize the
implied warranty of habitability. LPOs, however, are procedural. At the same
time as the implied warranty of habitability was sweeping the country, several
newly evolving doctrines seemed to cast grave doubt on the constitutionality of
LPOs. Curiously, however, few reported decisions consider such challenges.
This may reflect the paucity of low-income tenants’ litigative resources as well as
the difficulty low-income tenants faced staying in disputed units long enough for
their cases to reach appellate courts. At a minimum, these doctrines suggest that
LPOs were far from inevitable. Their prevalence therefore seems attributable to
courts’ deeper ambivalence about the tenants’ rights revolution.
First, just as courts were adopting LPOs, the Court was striking down filing
fees for divorces,264 double appeal bonds for tenants appealing eviction decisions,265 prohibitions on remarriages for absent parents behind on their child support payments,266 and paternity actions in which putative fathers were denied
blood tests for which they could not pay.267 When the Court upheld filing fees
for bankruptcy268 and for appeals of welfare fair hearing decisions,269 it distin259
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guished the prior cases as involving a state monopoly on the means to resolve
those petitioners’ claims. Defendants by definition face a judicial monopoly on
resolution of the claims brought against them.270 The Court also seemed to think
that some of the access fees it upheld were de minimus burdens that would not
deter determined litigants;271 monthly rental payments are not de minimus.272
A second line of cases during this period struck down coerced pre-judgment
deprivations of property.273 The Court required a prior judicial determination of
probable cause to support the seizure opposing claimant’s position274 and, even
then, permitted deprivations only for the briefest of periods necessary to arrange
and hold a hearing to adjudicate the claims to possession of the disputed
property.275 The Court also required the party seeking a seizure post a bond
against wrongful deprivations of property.276 Coerced deprivations, such as
LPOs, are treated identically with physical seizures.277 Whether or not the rent is
turned over to the landlord, the property is ―impounded and, absent a bond, put
totally beyond [the defendant’s] use during pendency of the litigation‖ and hence
seized.278 Beyond this, the court must balance the parties’ interests in
determining whether any pre-judgment seizure is justified.279 At a minimum,
these cases would seem to compel courts to hold a trial of the possession dispute

269

Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973); see also Bankers Life and Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw,
486 U.S. 71 (1988)(upholding fifteen percent penalty on unsuccessful appeals of money judgments).
270
In Little, Lindsey, and Hovey, litigants successfully challenging access barriers had been brought
into court involuntarily as defendants. Kras and Ortwein rejected challenges from parties seeking
to initiate judicial proceedings. To be sure, fortuitous circumstances can determine whether a
litigant is a plaintiff or a defendant. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access
Fees: The Right to Protect One’s Rights — Part I, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1154-58. Once someone
is hailed into court as a defendant, however, she or he must depend on the court to vindicate her or
his rights in the litigation.
271
Kras, 409 U.S. at 449; Ortwein 410 U.S. at 660 (describing the fee as providing ―some small‖
revenues).
272
They most resemble the child support payments in Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 374.
273
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). This was one of the grounds on
which Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 318 N.Y.S.2d 11, 21 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1971), struck down New
York’s LPO statute.
274
North Georgia, at 606-07. Indeed, Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991), decided two
decades after LPOs came into broad use, holds that pre-judgment seizures may be unconstitutional
even after a showing of probable cause.
275
Id.
276
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 606-07 (1974).
277
See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 20 n.26 (1978).
278
North Georgia, 419 U.S. at 606.
279
Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 606-10. Crucial in Mitchell were that the proceedings there had a ―low risk
of a wrongful determination of possession,‖ id. at 610, that the issues were amenable to simple
documentary proof, id. at 609-10, and the relatively modest stakes for those subject to seizure, id. at
610. None of these factors militate in favor of LPOs.

50

within about ten days.280 They also would invalidate automatic requirements for
escrow payments without specific judicial findings.281
More broadly, the Court in this period was exploring numerous application of
the longstanding principle that ―[t]he fundamental requisite of due process of law
is the opportunity to be heard‖,282 allowing the defendant to ―choose for himself
whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest.‖283 By 1976, the Court had
crystallized much of its due process analysis into the Mathews v Eldridge284
balancing test, weighing ―the private interest that will be affected‖, ―the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards‖, and
―the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.‖285 Tenants’ private interests, as the Court has acknowledged,286
are substantial; a tenant’s leasehold also was recognized as property at common
law, long before the advent of the ―new property.‖ The risk of erroneous deprivation when a tenant failing to make required payments is denied a trial on her or
his defenses is roughly equal to the fraction of tenants with good defenses.287
The probable value of doing away with the sanctions for LPOs is the sum of the
individual values of each of the ―procedural safeguards‖ that would then become
available at a trial. The procedural detriment also is high where failure to make
required payments results in loss of the right to a jury.288 As for the governmental interests, the state shares the tenant’s interest in an accurate adjudication.289
This is particularly true where those adjudications seek to serve the broader
social aims of the implied warranty of habitability. The state has interests in the
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well-being of both its landlords and its tenants, but those interests seem more apt
to support substantive rules than procedures shifting burdens among litigants.290
These and other theories291 would have been contested. They nonetheless
suggest that courts had ample means to question LPOs’ legitimacy, had they been
so inclined.
B. Procedural Failures: From New Property to Old
A few jurisdictions recognized that procedural change was necessary to implement the tenants’ rights revolution’s substantive changes.292 As a result, they
relied on a self-transformation by the least-funded, lowest status courts in the
judiciary, courts with well-developed sets of commitments largely inconsistent
with the new regime’s needs. This naïve hope sprang from an overestimation of
the importance of the line between courts and administrative agencies. Just as
procedural due process and legitimacy concerns have compelled administrative
tribunals to take on many of the characteristics of courts, managerial considerations have caused low-level courts to become more like administrative agencies.
Although landlord-tenant courts emphatically adhere to a judicial form, they
have much in common with administrative tribunals. Like administrative agencies, they must efficiently handle large numbers of cases with modest resources.
Like administrative tribunals, they occupy an extremely low place in the legal
system’s social and structural hierarchy. Their decisions often are subject to
review by courts with little or no other appellate jurisdiction.
The adversarial system implicitly assumes that parties are rational actors with
lawyers and substantial, evenly matched resources to devote to litigation.293
None of these assumptions are reliably met in eviction cases, with tenants’ lack
of representation and inferiority of resources particularly telling. Even as lowstatus courts were holding tenants rigidly to the adversarial requirement that they
develop the facts of repair problems, elite courts – whose litigants were far bet-
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ter-suited to function adversarily – were increasingly adopting continental ideas
giving judges more responsibility for factual development.294
Welfare recipients’ inability to initiate actions prevented Goldberg v. Kelly’s
administrative hearing system from transforming public welfare law, but those
hearing officers did far better at reaching individualized, merits-based adjudications despite inferior resources and far more complex substantive law.295 Whether by transferring eviction cases to actual administrative tribunals or relying on
magistrates, special masters, or other para-judicial officers whose lower cost and
specialization allowed them to devote the time required to inquire into the condition of the premises, easing the resource constraints and either abandoning or destabilizing courthouse culture could have resulted in much broader application of
the implied warranty. This sort of transformation occurred a decade or so later in
another area of law with a strong adversarial history: child support. Some states
maintain highly judicialized child support systems, many responded to federal incentives to transfer most jurisdiction to administrative tribunals.296 Whether or
not the cases stayed in court, states adopted guidelines substantially narrowing
adjudicatory discretion.297
C. The Dynamics of Housing Problems
The most fundamental challenge for the tenants’ rights revolution, one even
harder to remedy than inconsistent substantive rules or unresponsive courts,
springs from its inability to adapt to social and economic change. In particular, it
is rooted in a conception of bad housing that seemed to make sense in the peculiar conditions of the late 1960s and early 1970s but that has long-since become
obsolete. Just as the welfare rights revolution’s response to the problems of arbitrary eligibility workers and malicious states proved wholly ineffectual when the
national consensus in favor of subsistence benefit programs collapsed, the tenants’ rights revolution was ill-equipped to respond to housing problems not involving vermin and falling plaster.
1. Types of Bad Housing
Housing is one of the most socially and economically complex commodities
individuals purchase. Housing arrangements can adversely affect residents in at
least four different ways. First, most obviously, housing can include unhealthy
or unsafe conditions. Second, it can be remote from important services its occupants need. Third, it can provide too little room for the number of people occupying it. And fourth, it can consume so much of the residents’ income that they
face deprivation of other necessities. All four types of housing problems can
cause severe harm.
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Decaying housing can cause profound harm. Chipping and peeling paint at
home is the dominant cause of childhood lead poisoning, which can profoundly
and permanently stunt children’s intellectual and emotional development.298
Asthma is the leading cause of urban school absences, and roach, rodent, and
mold infestation are leading causes of asthma.299
Living in inexpensive areas increases the difficulty and cost of obtaining
employment and child care. One study found that for every dollar low- and
moderate-income working families save on housing they spend seventy-seven
cents more on transportation: those in relatively inexpensive housing had to pay
more than three times as much for transportation.300 Indeed, some forty-four percent of moderate-income working families devote more than half of their incomes to shelter and transportation.301 Inexpensive areas also often have bad
schools,302 crime, violence, and a dearth of opportunities303 that can have longterm impacts on children’s lives. Access to jobs has become increasingly important as public benefit programs have ceased to aid the long-term unemployed
and increased the administrative burdens of retaining assistance.304
Overcrowded housing, too, has a significant negative impact on children’s
educational attainment305 and health.306 Children in crowded housing are more
likely to suffer delayed cognitive development, to have trouble reading, and to
act out in school.307 Crowding into smaller spaces is only a partially successful
strategy: overcrowded families remain at unusually high risk for food
shortages.308
And high housing costs take their toll. Moderate-income working tenants
spending more than half of their incomes on housing spend significantly less on
food and clothing, and barely a quarter as much on health care, as those whose
housing costs consumed no more than thirty percent of their funds.309 As a result,
they are significantly more likely to run out of food before the end of the month
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and to lack health insurance than similar families in more affordable housing. 310
Children in food insecure households such as these are thirty percent more likely
to be hospitalized and ninety percent more likely to be in fair or poor health than
their peers; they also are more likely to have mental illnesses and problems in
school.311 High housing costs are a significant cause of the high rate of personal
indebtedness among low- and moderate-income families.312
Stating which of these defects is the most harmful is impossible a priori. For
example, although numerous physical defects may endanger residents’ physical
health, overcrowding can endanger their mental health, isolation from health care
facilities can cause treatable conditions to fester, and so can rents so high that the
tenant cannot afford medication. Low-income tenants could quite reasonably
choose badly maintained housing over a better but more expensive dwelling.
Children in public housing projects – widely regarded as affordable but low quality – are significantly more likely to advance in school than other children in tenant households.313
2. The Changing Mix of Bad Housing
When courts and legislatures began to recognize the implied warranty of habitability, housing codes routinely imposed maximum occupancy requirements
and the relationship between housing value and location was well-known.314 Indeed, overcrowding historically has been at least as prominent an image of slum
housing as physical defects.315 And many of the same studies that mobilized concern about bad housing also detailed the broader effects of poverty.316
Conditions at the time, however, distracted policymakers, activists, and many
scholars from forms of bad housing other than disrepair. A glut of housing resulting from explosive suburban growth and white flight yielded historically low
rents. This, in turn, reduced the extent of overcrowding: a low-income family
might move into a cramped unit, but it was less likely to have to double-up with
another low-income family.317 Optimism about the simultaneous welfare rights
revolution likely also produced complacency about the availability of necessary
310
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funding.318 Finally, rapid suburbanization was turning on its head the traditional
means of valuing location in which property values declined the farther out from
the center.319
As the unusual conditions of the 1960s and 1970s subsided, however, the
unsustainable housing glut disappeared and more typical housing market conditions reasserted themselves. New rental housing construction disproportionately
targets the top fifth of the rental market,320 doing little to ease pressures in the
lower end of the market. Housing costs are rising faster than median incomes
and much faster than incomes in the lower end of the distribution.321
Data from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s
(HUD’s) American Housing Survey over past three decades show a huge decline
in unsubsidized low-rent housing.322 This same data show a significant increase
in overcrowding among low-income people, particularly in the prosperous metropolitan areas on the east and west coasts where redevelopment has reestablished
the desirability of central locations.
As a result, HUD has reported that about half of very-low-income renters not
receiving public subsidies have ―worst-case‖ housing problems.323 Almost sixty
percent of tenants with worst-case housing needs are children, elderly, or people
with disabilities.324 Almost four in five very-low-income renters had moderate to
severe housing problems – bad conditions, crowding, or housing consuming so
much of the family’s budget that it tends to crowd out other necessities325 – with
most of the rest apparently receiving government subsidies.326
Yet over the decades since the implied warranty became widely recognized,
the nature of these worst-case problems has changed. The number of very-lowincome tenants reported in severely inadequate conditions has dropped by about
318
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two-thirds, but the number with crushing rent burdens skyrocketed.327 Despite a
broad consensus that housing should not consume more than one-third of a
family’s budget, some sixty percent of households with incomes below half of
their area’s median pay over half of their incomes for rent.328 Thirteen million
working families, including four million supported by a full-time worker, pay
over half of their incomes on shelter.329
The substantive and procedural obstacles discussed above suggest that the
warranty of habitability is unlikely to have played any significant role in reducing
the incidence of housing defects. That probably is the result of the lack of longterm economic viability of much of the low-cost housing market except in areas
with extremely low land values. The current glut resulting from the burst housing bubble is depressing housing values in the short-term, although likely not to
the degree that white flight did in the post-World War II decades. The lesson of
the past thirty years, however, is that this momentarily inexpensive housing will
not last: some will be rehabilitated and reabsorbed into the middle-income market, and much of the rest will be abandoned and destroyed. Because much of the
newly vacant housing is of less substantial construction than what the new suburbanites left behind in the central cities previously, the process of decay and abandonment may proceed more rapidly.
3. Consequences of Selective Enforcement of the Warranty
As shown above, substantive and procedural limitations on the new landlordtenant regime tend to limit the warranty of habitability’s applicability to more affluent tenants that deliberately initiate disputes with their landlords rather than
poorer ones who might raise the warranty in distress. This has several perverse
impacts, some apparent and others hidden. Most obviously, this frustrates the
redistributive and humanitarian purposes of the reforms and leaves most serious
housing problems unaddressed. In fact, however, the net effect of the new
regime, if selectively enforced in this manner, may be negative rather than
neutral. A major source of new, low-cost unsubsidized housing long has been
units that ―trickle-down‖ from higher-cost housing markets after years of disrepair.330 If middle-income tenants compel their landlords to keep up their
dwellings, the slow decay that allows units to migrate to the low-cost market may
be averted.
This could suggest that, at least in healthy cities, low-income tenants’ quality
of life may not be improving even if the incidence of housing code violations
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may have declined. Some continue to under-consume housing, but in a different
ways: renting units that are too small or in isolated or dangerous areas rather than
ones that are decrepit. Others may be consuming more housing but having to pay
for doing so with painful sacrifices in other areas of consumption, such as food,
clothing, and utility service. The lack of ―trickle-down‖ housing is certainly not
the only factor in shrinking the supply of low-cost housing. Gentrification,
continued lower-profile efforts at urban renewal, and recent reductions in federal
housing subsidies331 all have reduced supply at the same time the stagnation of
the minimum wage, cuts in income support programs, and other factors have
increased in poverty and hence demand. This suggests that the low-cost housing
market in many areas is precarious enough to present limited opportunities to
generate improvements in housing quality or to increase tenants’ well-being
without risking potentially serious unintended consequences.
The story likely is somewhat different in the ailing cities in the nation’s heartland. There, declining populations have placed less pressure on housing demand.
Abandonment, however, has caused a continuing exodus of units from the lowcost housing market. Enforcing the warranty of habitability on behalf of middleincome tenants deliberately raising repair claims cannot halt the deterioration of
low-cost housing to the point that abandonment becomes economically feasible.
Here, stronger enforcement of the warranty of habitability on behalf of those in
the worst housing may still have significant promise. But, as shown above, that
remains an elusive goal.
D. The Failure of the Implied Warranty of Habitability
Although appealing in the abstract, the new regime of landlord-tenant law inaugurated four decades ago has proven a failure at achieving any of its major
goals. Some individual tenants no doubt have benefited. Some inefficient landlords may have been induced to sell to companies better capable of performing
repairs. And in some segments of the middle-income housing market, these reforms may have achieved positive results. For the most part, however, the supposed tenants’ rights revolution is the legal system’s exercise in self-delusion.
As different as its doctrinal and institutional setting, the tenants’ rights revolution in the end succumbed to the same six defects that doomed the contemporaneous welfare rights revolution. First, its multiplicity of goals prevents a definitive assessment. It did introduce more contract principles into landlord-tenant
law, although the result is still very much a hybrid without particularly compelling reasons for its idiosyncrasies. Without a better-defined goal than ―modernization,‖ this seems a rather modest achievement. Its substantive and procedural
limitations appear to have confined its direct effects to a tiny handful of cases.
These likely were too few to have much impact on overall urban environment or
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the broader distribution of wealth. The extreme infrequency of the implied warranty’s application has prevented an empirical resolution to the debate about
whether it would improve the lot of low-income tenants or burden them with an
inefficient housing market. It did allow some sophisticated, or represented, tenants the choice of whether to demand repairs: instead of an absolute right for all
tenants, then, the implied warranty should be analyzed as an option available to
the small minority of tenants winning the legal services ―lottery.‖ 332 These individual tenants may be best-equipped to assess whether their particular landlords
will respond and whether the value to them of repairs exceeds not only the risks
of litigating but also any increase in rent as their dwelling becomes more desirable. The warranty may therefore have accomplished some redistribution on a
micro scale. Still, those tenants most in need of redistribution – or simply humanitarian aid – are typically among the least-able to assert the warranty.
Second, many of these shortcomings result from its inability to resist moralizing at low-income people. Those most likely to find the new defenses worth raising, and who typically live in the worst housing, are very low-income tenants
falling behind on their rent involuntarily. Yet the new regime could not bring itself to enlist these willing soldiers because the consequences of their poverty disturbed it. The presence of a few redistributionalists in their midst also may have
alarmed the new regime’s other supporters and caused them to bend over backwards to demonstrate that they were not seeking to give poor tenants something
for nothing. The stakes for landlords – and their superior wealth, connections
with social elites, and ability to organize collective action – made a backlash inevitable. History suggests that attacks on low-income people often take the form
of moralizing. Nonetheless, the regime’s champions were unprepared for that
backlash and failed to equip judges and legislators to resist it.
Third, because the new regime never developed any coherent theory of why
many tenants had low incomes, it was unprepared for the procedural challenges it
was creating. The same lack of basic skills that prevents many low-income
people from obtaining better jobs that would allow them to afford better housing
also tends to make them ineffective advocates in court. More broadly, it replaced
a system in which landlords dominate by financial capital alone with one in
which they dominate by a combination of financial and human capital.
Fourth, the tenants’ rights revolution’s crude vision of economics required it
to assume the conditions required for its success. Some of these – particularly a
glut of rental housing – may fortuitously have existed at the revolution’s inception. Others were lacking, including market conditions that prevented landlords
from exiting the low-rent housing market and sufficient incentives for tenants to
deliberately withhold rent.
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Fifth, the tenants’ rights revolution relied on an equally simplistic understanding of the lower courts that hear eviction cases. Hard-pressed courts can and do
ration adjudicatory resources and otherwise behave in many of the same ways as
administrative agencies. Judges and clerks have well-established views of their
mission. Many have longstanding relationships with repeat-player landlords and
landlords’ lawyers.
Finally, and most importantly, the revolution’s multiplicity of goals prevented
any creative adaptation to the dramatic changes in both housing markets and antipoverty policy since the revolution’s onset. Resurrecting the new regime of landlord-tenant law will require a willingness to confront these and other entrenched
problems and the devotion of political capital to surmount them. Based on the
record to date, we have little grounds for optimism.
CONCLUSION
The narrow lesson is that direct subsidies have far more potential than regulation to improve low-income tenants’ housing conditions. Researchers have come
to see improving incomes, rather than housing-specific strategies, as pivotal to
preventing homelessness.333 HUD reports the number of tenants with worst-case
housing needs moderates only when incomes rise.334 In a sense, the implied warranty was a forerunner of the movement to shift responsibility for aiding low-income people to elements of the private sector, albeit here unwilling ones.
Housing assistance programs increasingly attempt to address all four kinds of
bad housing. Units long have needed to pass inspections to receive subsidies
under federal voucher programs. Since the late 1960s, federal subsidy programs
have sought to limit tenants’ shelter costs to thirty percent of their incomes.335 A
family’s size determines the size of the unit for which it is eligible. And Congress and HUD have steadily made housing vouchers more portable, allowing
low-income recipients to move from areas of concentrated poverty.336 Unfortunately, Congress consistently has failed to increase the supply of housing vouchers
sufficiently to offset the shrinkage in unsubsidized low-cost housing. As a result,
only one in five eligible families receives a subsidy.337
The broader lesson is that a far more sophisticated approach is required to
regulate effectively on behalf of low-income people. Even Milton Friedman recognized that a necessary quid-pro-quo for avoiding the inefficiency of regulatory redistributions was an adequate system of direct supports for low-income
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people.338 With contemporary conservatives’ increasingly unwilling to support
tax-and-transfer policies, low-income people’s advocates cannot afford to abandon regulatory responses to humanitarian problems altogether.
Regulatory interventions, however, must be much more carefully designed.
First, they should either seek to correct some demonstrable market failure or
should serve an important humanitarian purpose. Vague concepts like modernization are unlikely to mobilize much support but can sow confusion. Instrumental arguments also muddy the waters and make the enterprise vulnerable to counter-proposals to accomplish the same ends in another way. Above all, even a hint
of broad redistributive goals will taint the effort and cause its champions to make
disastrous concessions to distance themselves from that taint.
Second, humanitarian regulation should not be attempted unless its advocates
are prepared to respond to efforts to stigmatize beneficiaries. Thus, for example,
prohibiting utility terminations during winter months will benefit spendthrifts as
well as infirm seniors; if the plan’s proponents are unwilling to make the case
that cutting off anyone’s heat in the dead of winter is inhumane, debates over
what are and are not worthy causes for arrearages will quickly consume the plan.
Third, the system’s operation should be as automatic as possible. Relying on
low-income people to negotiate even fairly simple procedures, or bureaucracies
to empathize with them and adjudicate in their favor, all but guarantees a high
failure rate. Moral tests are among the most problematic to adjudicate; avoiding
them is likely to improve the regulatory regime’s operation considerably.
Fourth, burdens should be spread broadly through society to avoid creating an
obvious core of opponents. Barring winter shut-offs, for example, increases utility companies’ costs, which they presumably pass on to consumers. The impact
on each individual consumer, however, is too small to spur a political mobilization.
Fifth, where possible regulatory interventions should target changes whose
benefits clearly exceed their costs. Thus, for example, the cost for a landlord to
cover exposed wiring is a pittance, yet the potential harm to the tenant’s children
is extreme. Imposing severe penalties for exposed wiring is unlikely to drive
them from the market. Such a regulatory regime would merely reproduce the result the parties likely would have negotiated themselves with full information and
bargaining capacity.
Finally, where regulation demands costly changes, advocates should carefully
explore the possible collateral consequences. They then should monitor implementation and be prepared to adapt if new or unnoticed conditions undermine
their regulatory scheme the way housing market changes undermined the tenants’
rights revolution. For example, the cost of abating lead paint is daunting, but the
lifelong harm to children exposed to lead makes it necessary. The cost is great
enough to affect the supply of rental housing. Advocates therefore should con338
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sider whether subsidizing those costs or taking other actions to preserve housing
supply are cost-effective and they should monitor changes in that supply.
Even following all of these principles will provide no guarantees of success
and will not supplant fiscal policy as the primary means of protecting lowincome people from humanitarian crises. It will, however, mean that all of the
hope and effort invested in the tenants’ rights revolution will not be in vain.
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